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Chapter I

The Report In Brief
INTRODUCTION
The vast literature concerning the impact of the
Federal grant system on State-local expenditures is
one indication of the importance of this topic. Yet,
although the literature is vast, there are outright
gaps in grant impact knowledge and issues on which
debate still rages.
With respect to the issues of debate, controversy
exists about whether or not grants stimulate certain
classes of expenditure or simply result in tax reduction; whether stated allocation goals are achieved
best by block or categorical grants; and whether the
grant system significantly equalizes variations in
recipient governments' financial capacity.
The policy response to the impact issue and other
Federal grant-in-aid questions has been to continuously add to and patch up the grant system in a
piecemeal fashion, hoping to better achieve particular, and frequently conflicting, goals. However, while
this patching-up has continued, the fiscal problems
to which grants are addressed have altered. The concern throughout the mid-1960s was to design programs that assist State and local governments to
meet the public service needs of the poor. The focus
of State and local officials now is oriented more toward meeting salary demands of government employees, surmounting potential problems posed by
unfunded pension liabilities, and coping with the

rising cost of capital facilities. In general, the central
contempor&y concern of State and local government
officials is to keep up with inflation-induced cost
increases at a time when unemployment and basic
economic structural difficulties in certain regions
continue to erode the tax base. Because of these
changing -and multiple -concerns, it is likely that
the response of the Federal grant system to any
particular issue is not fully appropriate.
The goal of this study is to assess the impact of the
Federal grant system on State and local government
finances. This research departs from earlier analyses
by its emphasis on different types of Federal grants
and their differing impacts on the State and local
sectors. The topics and the impact analysis presented
either differ from those of previous impact analyses
or are covered in considerably greater detail.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Chapter I1 provides a description of the interstate
diversity in fiscal arrangements that presently exist
in the United States. This variety of fiscal relationships is considered in terms of State versus local
responsibilities for the financing and delivery of
public sector activities, and States are classified according to these characteristics.
In Chapter 111, attention initially is focused on a
description of the Federal grant system, including a

typology of Federal grants based on a range of grant
characteristics and their potential for diverse effects.
The issue of State participation in various Federal
grant programs is analyzed.
Chapter IV examines the impact of Federal aid on
aggregate State and local government expenditures,
employment, and wage rates.

BASIC FINDINGS AND QUESTIONS
Findings
The central question posed by this study is: Does
the form of grant make a difference? In terms of
fiscal impact (the effect of Federal grants on aggregate State and local expenditures, wage rates, and
employment levels), the answer is yes. In terms of
State participation in the grant system, the answer
again is affirmative.
The findings of this study suggest that Federal
grants of different types tend to stimulate the Statelocal sector by different degrees - for one dollar of
Federal aid, more than a dollar of State-local spending results.' This stimulative finding is based on associations between outlays for various classifications
of grants (and the grant aggregate) and total current
State-local expenditures, other than welfare transfer payments.
This finding, it must be emphasized, is for Statelocal expenditures in the aggregate. It does not imply
that each and every Federal grant program in every
governmental jurisdiction is stimulative. It does
mean, however, that total State and local expenditures for all jurisdictions increased more than proportionately per dollar of Federal aid.

Whether the analytical approach focuses on aid
for a particular program and associated State-local
program expenditures or on aggregate grant types
(for various programs) and total State-local expenditures, it is possible a priori to find a substitutive
pattern in Federal aid. Substitution of Federal aid
for State-local expenditures means that an additional
dollar of grant money results in less than an additional dollar of State-local spending (inclusive of
Federal aid) for either the particular function or total
State-local expenditures. If the substitutive pattern
were found, and it was not in this study, it would
imply that Federal grants for a particular program
were used, in part, either to replace own-source
State-local expenditures (the latter being freed for
other program areas) or to reduce State-local taxes.

Aggregate vs. Individual Program Question
This study is principally concerned with various
grant forms and their effects, rather than the effects
of a particular grant in a given program area. Admittedly, if a sufficient number of particular programs using different grant forms were studied, one
could draw conclusions as to the possible differential
effects of various grant instruments. This type of
analysis would necessitate a case study approach to
the grant instrument question. Even assuming that
data limitations would not constrain the number of
program areas included, the familiar limitation of all
case studies still exists -whether or not sufficient
programs supported by the various grant instruments
had been examined to warrant generalizing the conclusions. In the absence of sufficient data and resources, this study pursued the aggregate approach.

Cross Section vs. Time Series Question
Stimulation vs. Substitution Question
Stimulation can be thought of-and, in some
cases, has been studied-in another context. It is
possible to relate, for at least some programs, grants
for a particular program to State-local expenditures
for that program. For example, if Federal aid for
highways tends to be associated with increased ownsource State-local spending for highways, it can be
concluded that the Federal grant stimulates Statelocal highway spending. To use this approach is to
define stimulus in regard to the particular aided
program area. It is the aggregate approach, however,
rather than the individual program or functional
analysis, that is pursued in this study.

Another fundamental analytical point is that this
study-similar to the vast majority of grant impact
studies-pursues a cross section, rather than a time
series, approach and assesses grant impact among
the States for a single year- 1972. The findings are
that, for a given year, the 50 State-local fiscal systems, on average, tend to have different expenditure,
employment, and, to a lesser extent, wage responses
to different grant classifications after other relevant
factors are accounted for. I n a general sense, the conclusion of this study is that all Federal grants tend
to call forth additional State-local own-source expenditures but that this result is greater for some
types of grants than for others.

This cross section approach, as noted above, differs from time series analysis. The latter looks at the
impact question over a period of years rather than
at a particular year. It relates State-local expenditures in the aggregate or for a particular program
area over a period of years to the grants received
over the same time span. This approach asks the
general question: Is the growth or decline in Statelocal expenditures for a particular time period related
to the growth or decline of Federal grants?
The difference between the time series and cross
section analyses can be illustrated with a hypothetical example. Assume that a Federal grant is adopted
for a program currently not supported by the Statelocal sector. If this grant program is attractive to
States and localities, it is likely, at the outset, to be
highly stimulative of additional State-local expenditures (in part because State-local governments initially were not providing this program). As time passes,
the State-local expenditure response to the grant can
be considered, as a possibility, to slide through a
continuum - from high, to moderate, to low stimulation and, eventually, to a substitutive effect.
Using the time series approach, these various
stimulative-substitutive expenditure responses are
estimated as an average. Depending on the degree
and length of each phase of the various expenditure
responses, a single (average) relationship between
grants and State-local expenditures is estimated.
In contrast, the cross section method looks at a
particular year. If the year chosen is early in the
grant's existence, cross section analysis would show
a highly stimulative relationship between the Federal
grant and State-local expenditures. If the year selected for analysis is at the end of the period covered
by the time series study, cross section analysis would
show a substitutive relationship. If the year analyzed
falls in the middle of the time period, the results of
the cross section study would show some stimulation
-either moderate or low.
In summary, it is possible to find that the Federal
grant system is stimulative or substitutive from cross
section studies. Previous studies have found both
responses, although stimulation is the more frequently estimated response. Either finding from a cross
section study, however, is compatible with either
finding from a time series analysis; the grant system
may be stimulative at a given point in time and
either stimulative or substitutive over a time span.
Conversely, the system may be substitutive for a
given year and either substitutive or stimulative over
a period of years. The critical point is that although

the grant system was found to be stimulative for
1972, this finding does not prove that the system is
stimulative, rather than substitutive, for any particular time period or program.

The Year Studied
The year used for analysis in this study is 1972.
In some respects, 1972 may be considered an atypical
year. The State-local sector registered a substantial
surplus, as measured by the national income accounts, while the grant system was marked by increased reliance on the block grant approach.' Inflation and unemployment -stagflation -became
a
notable economic condition.
This year - 1972 -may be considered to be an
atypical year for a second reason. It stood at the
crest of a rising servicing curve that has slowed
significantly in subsequent years. According to this
view, 1972 is considered, at least by some, to be
more representative of the old order-the way that
intergovernmental fiscal business used to be handled
-than of the current grant system.
To some extent, these criticisms of 1972 are valid.
However, they must be put into perspective. To affect the results of this study, it would have to be
shown that the distinctive features of 1972 (and no
year is wholly free of them) affected to a substantially different degree both the grant system and the individual State-local expenditure responses, thereby
reducing the explanatory power of the estimating
equations used. This is not, however, the case, because the statistical results do, in fact, provide good
fits to the data. Indeed, these results are sufficiently
strong to refute the view that the distinctive features
of 1972 make this an atypical and, therefore, unreliable year for analysis. To the contrary, the general
economic and grant factors used in this study help to
explain over 90 percent of the interstate variation in
public sector wages and over 80 percent of the differences in public employment levels. These findings
leave relatively little to be explained by other historical, institutional, governmental, or distinctive factors.
The selection of the year 1972 might be more
seriously questioned if the purpose of the analysis
was to project the results or to apply the conclusions
for the future. However, projection is not the purpose
of this study. But, it can be claimed that the conclusions of this analysis are of considerable relevance
for years other than 1972.
Clearly, the Federal grant system has changed
substantially -general revenue sharing and block

grants have become much more important components, in dollar terms, of the Federal grant mix.
Moreover, proposals currently are being made to
increase further the use of broader, less restrictive
types of Federal aids. Yet, one sin~plefact remainscategorical grants currently constitute approximately
75 percent of total Federal aid. Thus, this study,
which analyzes a year when various classifications of
categorical grants were the near exclusive grant
mechanism, still remains applicable for three-fourths
of the Federal aid system. To the extent that categorical aids become less important in the Federal aid
mix, the conclusions of this study will become, of
course, less comprehensive in their applicability. If
categorical aids should further shrink to, say, 50
percent of the total Federal grant system -a dramatic shift that does not seem applicable for the foreseeable future - it would' still be warranted to claim
that this study addresses issues posed by half (in
dollar terms) the Federal aid mix and the largest
single component of that system.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
State Classification
*The 50 State-local systems exhibit considerable diversity in their intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. Using nine
separate indices, patterns are found to
exist among these measures. States in
which the State sector dominates financing tend to provide services directly,
rather than to support them at the local
level via the grant-in-aid mechanism.
States in which the local sector dominates financing relationships tend to
have a higher ratio of State grants and a
higher local direct expenditure share.
On the basis of nonwelfare expenditure
ratios and financial responsibility shares
(for all functions), State government
dominant systems are found in Alaska,
Delaware, Hawaii, Vermont, Idaho,
Utah, West Virginia, Kentucky, and
South Carolina. Local governments
tend to dominate fiscal relations in California, Nevada, New York, Illinois,
Indiana,
Massachusetts,
Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas.

States in which local governments are
the dominant partner generally are more
populated, urban, and wealthier; in contrast, the State-dominated fiscal pattern
is found mainly in rural, less populated,
and below average income States.

Federal Grant Typology
Not surprisingly, the predominant grant
form in dollar terms is formula based
(rather than project), is given to States
(rather than localities), and is low match.
This grant form accounts for $21.0 billion
(65 percent) of the 1972 grant total.
Project grants, although more numerous,
are far less significant in dollar terms
than are formula grants.
Only 14 of the 100 U.S. Treasury grant
categories3 generally required a high
State-local match (at least 50 percent of
expenditures); 3 1, a low-match provision
(less than 50 percent); 28 were dominated
by grants with no matching requirements.
Matching provisions could not be determined for 27 grant categories.
Federal grants, for which local governments are the main recipient, generally
are project, rather than formula, based.
Thirteen of 15 grant categories, accounting for $2.7 billion of $3.4 billion in
Federal-local grants, were predominantly ofthis form in 1972.

Grant Participation
Grant participation -the per capita level
of Federal grant receipts- tends to be related to three measures of need -directly
with income but inversely with population size and urbanization.
Grant participation also is related to
intergovernmental fiscal arrangement
variables. State dominant systems tend
to receive higher per capita levels of
grants for each grant classification
analyzed.

Grant Impact

levels-an effect that differs markedly
for the various types of grant instruments. Thus, the main effect of the Federal grant system overall is to stimulate
State-local spending for additional public employees -to increase service levels
rather than public sector wages.

Previous empirical studies have generally, although not uniformly, found that
Federal grants tend to stimulate Statelocal expenditures - Federal aid induces
States and localities to spend more
than a dollar in total or for a particular
function per dollar of grants. However,
among the studies finding this stimulative effect, no clear-cut consensus is
found concerning the degree of stimulus.

ISSUES RAISED
The affirmative answers to the general question
addressed by this study-does the form of grant
make a difference-can be sharpened by focusing
on the following specific policy-oriented issues:

The findings of theoretical studies suggest that, for a given public good or
service, State-local expenditures increase
more from receiving an open-ended
matching grant than from receipt of a
close-ended matching grant and least
from a nonmatching grant. Regardless
of the form of grant, the impact is
greater if the aid is provided for a good
or service not previously supported by
States and localities.

Do State-local fiscal arrangements -i.e.,
the State-local division of financing and
spending responsibilities - make a difference?
*Does the grant type-project versus formula - make a difference?
Do various types of matching requirements make a difference?
Do certain grant allocation factors affect grant participation?
Do welfare transfer payments by State
and local governments respond differently to Federal grants than to other
State-local expenditures?
Do Federal grants for construction purposes impact differently on the Statelocal sector than on grants for current
expenditures?

*This study found that grant impact does
differ for the different grant classifications - in a fiscal sense, the form of grant
does make a difference. The various
grant types -project,
formula, high
matching, low matching, and no matching4-all led to a stimulative response
by the State-local sector. This response
differed, however, among the various
grant instruments, regardless of whether
or not construction aids were included.

The Effect of State Financing Arrangements
Wage Rate Effect
Public sector wage rates are associated
with high-matching, low-matching, and
no-matching grants, but only when construction aids are excluded. Both highand no-matching grants are related to
lower public sector wage rates, while
low-matching grants are associated with
higher wages.

Employment Level Impact
.The major impact of each Federal grant
category is on public sector employment

*

State-local financing arrangements vary considerably among the States - ranging from the Statedominated approach of Hawaii to the locally dominated systems of California and New York. These
differing fiscal arrangements reflect a wide variety
of factors, which result, at least in part, from the
complexity or simplicity of the local governmental
structure and the traditions of particular States.
For the purpose of this study, intergovernmental
fiscal arrangements among the 50 State-local systems are classified into three groupings: State dominated, locally dominated, and mixed (see Chapter
11). The effects of these differences in intergovernmental arrangement are assessed with regard to:

Grant participation -i.e.,
per capita
Federal grant receipts -to determine if
these differences are systematically associated with State-local fiscal arrangements; and
@Grant impact, to determine whether or
not the differences in fiscal arrangements
among the States lead to differing expenditure responses regarding Federal
grant receipts.
The results of this study show that differing fiscal
arrangements are related to grant participation.
State-dominated fiscal systems receive the highest
levels of per capita grants for each grant type studied (project, formula, all matching, high matching,
and low matching), and locally dominated fiscal systems receive the lowest per capita amounts for each
grant type. Per capita grant receipts in States with
mixed fiscal systems are closer to the lower grant
receipts of locally dominated State systems.
Although all interstate variation in grant receipts
cannot be attributed to differences in State-local
fiscal arrangements, such differences are significant.
After accounting for certain socioeconomic factors - population, urbanization, and per capita income - the differences in fiscal arrangements between State dominant and locally dominant systems
tend to be related to the level of Federal aid receipts.
State dominant systems, for example, received:
$64 more per capita in total grants,
$21 more per capita in project grants,
$43 more per capita in formula grants,
$6 1 more per capita in all matching
grants,
$6 more per capita in high-matching
grants, but
$183 less per capita in no-matching
grants.
States in which the local sector dominates received uniformly lower per capita grants:
$54 less per capita in total grants,
$24 less per capita in project grants,
$30 less per capita in formula grants,
$26 less per capita in all matching grants,
$ 1 less per capita in high-matching
grants, and
$163 less per capita in no-matching
grants.

Thus, a tendency exists for the distribution of
Federal grant receipts among States to be associated
with differing State-local intergovernmental fiscal
arrangements.
No such tendency is found, however, in regard to
the expenditure response or grant impact question.
The difference between State-dominated and locally
dominated fiscal systems, as measured in this analysis, did not lead to any systematic differences in per
capita State-local spending, after various relevant
factors are accounted for. Indeed, no relationship is
found between the differing fiscal arrangements
among States and the level of either public sector
wage rates or employment. The conclusion that
emerges regarding the fiscal impact question is that,
after other factors are accounted for, no tendency exists for the level of per capita State and local government spending to be the result of different intergovernmental fiscal arringements.

The Effect of Grant Type: Project vs. Formula
Project and formula grants can be distinguished
in two ways. Project grants require positive action associated with the grantsmanship game- before a
grant is received. Applications must be made, detailed procedures must be followed, and approval
must be forthcoming before the grant is awarded.
Thus, project grants have a more voluntary aspect
than formula grants, for which recipient shares are
determined by allocating a fixed amount (aside from
a relatively few open-ended grants) according to one
or more distributional factors.
A second distinction centers on the scope of the
grant. Project grants are for particular program
areas in selected jurisdictions; a formula grant is
available for a program area and all jurisdictions
meeting the eligibility conditions. What then is the
effect of this distinction between grant forms in regard to grant participation and grant impact?
In terms of the distribution of these grant types
among State areas, little difference exists -at least
in regard to the population, urbanization, and per
capita income characteristics. Both project and formula grants tend to be distributed more often to
high rather than low-income States and to rural,
rather than urban, States. A further tendency occurs for formula grants to favor small population
States-a tendency that is much less marked for
project grants. Generally, both types of grants tend
to favor the same types of States-those that are
high income, rural, and less populated.

Although project and formula grants are received
by State areas of similar socioeconomic characteristics, they differ strikingly in terms of governmental
recipients. Not surprisingly, the State sector received 97 percent of all 1972 formula grants, either
primarily or exclusively, while all local jurisdictions
received only 3 percent. Local governments, in contrast, were the prime recipients of project grants<
(61 percent), while only 39 percent of the project
grant dollars went either primarily or exclusively
to the State sector. This reflects the fiscal, political,
and data-related difficulties in developing viable
substate allocation formulas.
Formula and project grants also differ in regard
to their matching requirement provisions. The ma'jority of formula-based grants, both in number and
dollars, are low matching (less than 50 percent).
Although the majority of project grants, in dollar
terms, are also of the low-matching variety, a much
higher share of project grants require no match than
was the case for formula aids. This distinction becomes even more pronounced in terms of the number
of grants-the largest single share of project grants,
but not a majority, have no match.
Thus, although project and formula grants tend
to be distributed to State areas of similar socioeconomic characteristics, they differed, at least as of
1972, in regard to their associated matching requirement characteristics and. most dramatically,
by type of recipient jurisdiction - State or local.
Both project and formula grants generally are
found to stimulate State-local expenditures; Statelocal spending per capita increased by more than
the additional dollar per capita of project and formula grants. The overall degree of stimulation was
somewhat higher for project grants than for formula
grants, whether or not construction aids were included ($1.92 versus $1.34 per capita per dollar of
Federal aid, including construction; $3.04 versus
$2.67 per capita per dollar of Federal aid, excluding
construction grants).
The largest component of the total project grant
stimulation, when construction aids are included,
resulted from welfare-related spending rather than
the more general effect of hiring additional employees.5 Indeed, when all State-local welfare
transfer spending was excluded, project grants are
found to be substitutive rather than stimulative.
In the case of formula grants, the stimulative effect continues even after the exclusion of welfare,
whether or not construction aids are included.
Thus, when construction aids are excluded, both

project and formula grants were found to be stimulative - including or excluding welfare transfers and, in both cases, the major component of the expendit ure stimulation resulted from increased public
sector employment, rather than from either wage
rate or welfare payment effects.
The somewhat greater stimulus of State-local current spending (excluding capital outlays) associated
with project grants occurs despite the fact that more
of these grants require low or no State-local matching. This finding -greater expenditure stimulus
from project rather than formula grants - suggests
that project grants tend to stimulate more additional
own-source State-local spending in programs related to the particular program aided than is true
for formula grants, and/or that project grants tend
to be more in line with State-local expenditure
preferences. The latter explanation perhaps reflects
greater voluntaryism associated with project grants.
Both project and formula grants were associated
with the hiring of additional State-local employees,6 while the relationships between both grant
types and State-local wage rates were not found to
be significant in the statistical sense.
The Effect of Matching Requirements
For the purpose of this study, Federal grants are
divided into high, low, and no State-local matching;
a high State-local match is defined as 50 percent or
more. The most striking finding from this classification is the predominance of low-matching grants,
which alone account for $25.6 billion of total 1972
grants; high and no-matching grants represent an
additional $1.8 billion and $4.7 billion, respectively.
Low-matching grants are distributed among States
in the same pattern found for most grant categories
studied. Thus, States with higher per capita incomes
and smaller, more rural populations tend to receive
higher per capita amounts of low-matching grant
dollars. This distributional pattern is also found for
high-matching grants, although the relationship between this grant type and both per capita income and
population size is tenuous.
Classified by matching provisions, each grant
type - high, low, and no matching -stimulate State
and local expenditures when construction grants
are both included and omitted. As might be expected, the greatest degree of expenditure stimulus
is associated with high-matching grants. Exclusion
of construction aids causes no departure from the
expected pattern - low-matching grants resulted in

a greater State-local expenditure response than did
no-matching grants. This differentiated response
pattern did not occur, however, when construction
aids were included. In this instance, low-matching
grants were found to be somewhat less stimulative
than were no-matching aids ($1.20 versus $1.39 per
capita per dollar of Federal aid)-an incompatibility that is removed when construction grants are
excluded from the analysis.
When both public welfare transfers and construction grants are excluded, the expected pattern of
stimulation again holds true-greater expenditure
stimulation is found for high-matching than for lowmatching grants, with the least resulting from nomatching grants. Inclusion of construction grants
leads to a repetition of the previously mentioned
unanticipated result-although the greatest degree
of stimulus is associated with high-matching grants,
no-matching aids are found to be more stimulative
than low-matching grants. Indeed, when public welfare transfers are excluded but construction aids included, low-matching grants fall into the substitutive,
rather than stimulative, response.
The three matching categories are found to be
much more stimulative of public sector employment
levels than of wage rates. Neither the inclusion nor
the exclusion of construction grants altered this
finding. Both high and no-matching grants are associated with lower wage rates in the public sector.

The Effect of Grant Allocation Factors
Formula-based grants use a wide variety of allocation factors to distribute Federal grants among
recipient jurisdictions. Three factors - population,
urbanization, and per capita income - are in fairly
common usage particularly the population measure.
How do these three measures affect grant participation -the per capita receipts of Federal grants?
The results of this study indicate a general pattern between Federal grant receipts in the aggregate
and for various grant types and the three allocation
factors. States with higher per capita incomes and
smaller, more rural populations tend to receive
higher per capita grants than do their poorer, larger, and urban counterparts. This pattern holds for
the grant aggregate and various cuts of the grant
system: nonwelfare grants, project grants, formula
grants, all matching grants, high-matching grants,
low-matching grants, grants to State governments,
and grants to local governments. In some cases,

the relationships found were not interpreted as sufficiently strong for the usual degree of statistical
confidence. Nor can it be ignored that in those
cases in which the associations were statistically
significant, the strength of the relationship differed
among the various grant types and the three allocation factors. Yet, the essential pattern remainsFederal grants in the aggregate and for each of various subclassifications tend to favor the richer, less
populated, and more rural States.
The three factors together explain roughly onefifth to one-third of interstate variation in aggregate Federal grant receipts. Thus, the great majority
of differences in per capita grant receipts among
States is not related to these three measures.7 This
unexplained portion of grant receipts can, of course,
reflect any number of influences -other grant allocation factors, and socioeconomic, political, institutional, and historical characteristics. Not all of
these potential explanatory factors, however, are
readily amendable to measurement.
In summary, the three general factors- per capita
income, population size, and urbanization -by
themselves provide relatively little explanation of
the differential degree of grant participation among
the 50 States.

The Welfare Transfer Impact
The effect of Federal grants on welfare transfer
payments is estimated in this study by the traditional impact model-i.e., grant receipts in the aggregate and for various subcategories, together with
other potential explanatory factors, are used to
analyze interstate differences in aggregate welfare
transfer payments. The grant variables used are the
tctal for each grant type and do not relate specifically to welfare grants. Thus, the question posed is:
What effects do differing types of grant aggregations
have on the level of welfare transfer payments in the
50 States?
Although it is not possible to determine the direct
effects of welfare grants on the various types of
transfer payments, it is possible to assess the effects
of the grant system and its components on welfare
transfer payments. Through this procedure, the indirect effects of the various grant mechanisms as
they ultimately impact on welfare transfer payments
can be captured. This procedure admits that the possibility of grant interchangeability -for all grants
and not just those for welfare transfers-may affect
these welfare transfers.

The results indicate that the various grant types
have strikingly different effects on welfare transfer
payments. For some grant types, the sate-local
transfer response falls in the stimulative range - an
additional dollar of all project grants increases
State-local welfare transfer payments by $1.1 7, while
a. comparable increase in high-matching grants for
all functions leads to a $4.94 per capita increase in
welfare transfer payments.8 For the grant aggregate
and for formula, low, and no-matching grants, the
results indicate a substitutive response - a one dollar
increase in each grant type leads to less than a dollar
increase in State-local welfare transfer payments
and, in the case of formula and no-matching grants,
an actual decrease in expenditures.
Construction vs. Current Grants
The impact study of Federal grants on the Statelocal sector is undertaken in two phases: first, all
Federal grants are analyzed and, second, only nonconstruction grants are analyzed. In both cases, the
impact of Federal aids is assessed with regard to
current expenditures of State and local governments.
The exclusion of construction grants gives a cleaner

FOOTNOTES

relationship between grants for current spending
and State-local nonconstruction expenditures. Yet,
this exclusion also carries the assumption that there
is no interchangeability between construction grants
and current spending-i.e., constructjon aids are assumed to affect only capital spending, with no carryover effects on current expenditures. Because this
may or may not be the case, the analysis is conducted for both.
The results of this study indicate that the exclusion of construction grants leads to a greater
degree of fiscal stimulus among State and local
governments. This is not to suggest that construction grants are either more or less stimulative with
regard to State and local capital expenditures, but
only that there is less stimulus between construction
grants and current State-local spending than between current grants and current expenditures. Although it is possible that construction grants exhibit
a substitutive pattern for current State-local expenditures, thereby lowering the degree of fiscal
stimulus, it is also possible that the lesser stimulation found when construction grants are included
mainly reflects a less clearly specified relationship
between grant and expenditure variables.

When used in the impact analysis, they are grouped as follous:
project-formula; high-low-no matching.

his

' A second. more strict test holds that stimulation occurs only
when State-local spending (including Federal aid) increases more
than the amount of the Federal grant plus that required by the
matching provisions. The less restrictive measure of stimulation.
disregarding the matching requirements. was used in this study.
7

' ~ e d e r a l general revenue sharing payments were initially received
in fiscal 1973.

* ~ h e s evarious grant classifications are not mutually exclusive.

reflects rhe relationship between all pr4ect grants and not
just those for welfare or welfare-related programs. Indeed. there
are few project grants for these purposes.
bThe relationship between project grants and employment. however, is not statistically significant when construction grants
are included.
7 0 f course. these three factors might explain much more of the
interstate variation in grant receipts for particular programs.

tive-is found when construction aids are excluded.

Chapter 11

A Classification of
State Fiscal Systems
To assess the impact of Federal aid on State and
local governments in a disaggregated manner, two
key building blocks must be created -a classification of State fiscal systems and of Federal grant
programs. This chapter addresses the State fiscal
arrangement question and groups the 50 States
into three categories - State dominant, locally dominant, and shared responsibility. This procedure is
the first step in determining the different impact
effects generated by different types of Federal
grants in States of varying fiscal structures.

INDICATORS OF
FISCAL ARRANGEMENT
A fiscal classification of the States according to
the division of Federal, State, and local financing
and service delivery responsibility is complicated
by the wide variety of arrangements and patterns
that presently exist. No single criterion can be used
to differentiate States according to their intergovernmental arrangement. Rather, it is necessary to
examine a number of fiscal variables representing
the financing and service delivery aspects of their
system. Although some maintain that each State
fiscal system is unique, this extremely differentiated
approach makes it difficult to draw general conclusions. The method pursued for the purposes of this

study is to develop a limited number of fiscal measures that are sufficient to capture the broad general
arrangements among the 50 States without sacrificing the significant differences in fiscal arrangements among individual States.
In this section, states' are grouped according to
three measures of fiscal arrangement: the division of
direct expenditure responsibility for major functions
between State and local governments; the division
of financing responsibility among the Federal,
State, and local sectors; and the overall level of
State and local government expenditures.

STATE FISCAL SYSTEMS
To develop a State fiscal classification scheme,
expenditure and financing data were gathered for
total State-local expenditures and four specific expenditure functions: education, highways, public
welfare, and health-hospitals.' From these data,
nine specific fiscal characteristics are derived (see
Table I).

Financing Ratios
The first three characteristics in Table 1 -percent of State and local government expenditures
financed by Federal, State, and local sectors, respectively -represent the relative financing responsi-

Table 1

Characteristics of State and Local Fiscal Systems:
Unweighted 50-State Averages, 1967 and 1972
(Coefficients of Variation in Parentheses)
Expenditure Functions

Fiscal Characteristics
All
Functions

1967
Federal Financing Share
State Financing Share
Local Financing Share

'

State Direct Expenditure Share
Local Direct Expenditure Share
Per Capita Expenditures ($)
State Grants as Share of
State Expenditures
Tax Effort Index1
Income Tax Share of Revenues

Education

Highways

19.4
(0.33)
43.9
(0.17)
36.7
(0.29)
44.0
(0.24)
56.0
(0.19)
491.OO
(0.28)
29.5
(0.36)
14.1
(0.15)
9.2
(0.91)

12.7
(0.34)
49.0
(0.24)
38.2
(0.36)
29.8
(0.38)
70.2
(0.16)
199.00
(0.22)
49.7
(0.2
7)
6.3
(0.19)

33.8
(0.39)
46.5
(0.26)
19.6
(0.59)
71.6
(0.17)
28.4
(0.44)
93.00
(0.64)
12.5
(0.84)
2.1
(0.33)

20.8
(0.23)
44.2
(0.14)
35.0
(0.24)
45.2
(0.23)
54.8
(0.19)
795.00
(0.31)
29.0
(0.34)
15.9
(0.20)
13.0
(0.65)

12.8
(0.37)
51.6
(0.20)
35.6
(0.37)
32.2
(0.37)
67.8
(0.18)
318.00
(0.27)
48.5
(0.27)
7.0
(0.20)

30.7
(0.34)
50.6
(0.2
2)
18.7
(0.55)
70.3
(0.20)
29.7
(0.48)
1 1 3.00
(0.48)
14.8
(0.95)
2.0
(0.39)

-

-

-

-

Public
Welfare

54.7
(0.23)
33.2
(0.34)
12.1
(0.96)
69.5
(0.51)
30.5
(1.16)
37.00
(0.38)
24.9
(1.45)
0.6
(0.36)
-

Health and
Hospitals

8.4
(0.62)
52.7
(0.33)
38.9
(0.47)
58.9
(0.31)
41.1
(0.45)
30.00
(0.32)
6.0
(1.lo)
1 .o
(0.28)
-

1972
Federal Financing Share
State Financing Share
Local Financing Share
State Direct Expenditure Share
Local Direct Expenditure Share
Per Capita Expenditures ($)
State Grants as Share of
State Expenditures
Tax Effort I ndexi
Income Tax Share of Revenues

61.9
(0.19)
29.8
(0.39)
8.4
(1.01)
78.8
(0.36)
21.2
(1.32)
82.00
(0.40)
16.6
(1.69)
0.8
(0.49)

9.0
(0.49)
50.9
(0.38)
40.1
(0.50)
57.0
(0.35)
43.0
(0.46)
54.00
(0.36)
6.2
(1.03)
1.3
(0.35)

-

'State plus locally financed expenditures as a fraction of per capita income.
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

'bilities of the three governmental levels. The Federal financing measure is the amount of State-local
expenditures financed at the Federal level and consists of Federal grants to States plus direct Federalto-local grants. The State financing measure consists of direct State expenditures plus State grants
to local governments, less local government payments to States and Federal grants to States. The
local financing measure is equal to local direct expenditures plus local payments to States, less State
grants to local governments and direct Federal-tolocal grants. Each financing measure represents
the amount of spending at the originating governmental level; these amounts subsequently are divided
by total State and local expenditures to determine
the percentage shares.
Interstate variations in these financing shares are
surprisingly wide. In 1972, the Federal share ranged
from 31.5 percent in Arkansas to 13.8 percent in
Wisconsin, with a 50-State average of 20.8 percent.
State financial responsibility ranged from 63.7 percent in Hawaii to 35.1 percent in New Jersey, with a
national average of 44.2 percent. The local financing
share varied from 49.5 percent in New Jersey to 16.0
percent in Hawaii, with 35.0 percent representing
the U.S. average.
Although considerable interstate variation exists
in the three financing share measures, the State
financing ratio exhibits, in both 1967 and 1972, the
least variability, not only for total State-local expenditures but also for the specific expenditure
functions (aside from public welfare). Because of
greater variability, the Federal and local financing
ratios tend to dominate the characterization of fiscal arrangements.
If the 50-State average is used to profile the average State financing arrangement, local government
financing does not appear to dominate any major
function for either 1967 or 1972. Moreover, during
the 5-year period, the financing role of local governments declined in total and for all major functions except health and hospitals. In contrast, the
State financing share increased for total Statelocal expenditures as well as for the education and
highway functions. By 1972, the State sector dominated the financing of these two functions, as well
as those of health and hospitals (for which the State
direct expenditure share actually declined). The only
function dominated by the Federal Government
was public welfare and was the most decisive financing shift to occur in this 5-year period.
Although no close relationship is illustrated be-

*

tween the level of the State financing share in 1967
and the changes in this share from 1967 to 1972
that would apply to all States, a tendency does
occur for those States with higher State financing
shares to decrease them and those with smaller
State shares to register increases (see Table 2). This
observation suggests that there has been a two-way
convergence toward a narrowing of interstate variations in the State financing ratio.
8

Expenditure Ratios
The second group of fiscal characteristics in
Table I -State
and local direct expenditure
shares -describe
final spending responsibilities,
rather than original source of finance, of State and
local governments. The State expenditure share of
total State and local direct expenditures in 1972
ranged from 79.4 percent in Hawaii to 23.1 percent
in New York, with the average State share at 45.2
percent. Using the average spending ratio to categorize functions suggests that dominant State government responsibility is expenditures for highways
and public welfare, while local governments dominate spending responsibility for education. Shared
responsibility is perhaps the best description of the
health and hospitals function.
Between 1967 and 1972, a small increase is registered in the overall State expenditure role, largely
because of the heavier Federal involvement in welfare financing. Local expenditure responsibility,
however, rose for two functions -health and highways. For the health function, this increase was a
result, on average, of an increased local financing
effort. For the highway function, the rise was due to
increased State grants. It should be noted again,
that these characterizations are based on the ,U.S.
average and, thus, do not represent trends that are
shared among all States.
No systematic relationship was disclosed between the changes in direct expenditure responsibility from 1967 to 1972 and the 1967 level of the State
spending ratio (see Table 3). Thus, there is no clearcut movement toward a relative increase in local
expenditure responsibility in States that were either
State or local dominant in 1967. Nor did the variation in State and local expenditure responsibility
ratios exhibit any substantial change between 1967
and 1972. Thus, in contrast to the financing ratios,
no trend toward homogeneity among States was
found in expenditure responsibility.

Table 2

Distribution of States by Change in State Financing Share, 1.967-1972
Number of
States

Average 1967
Financing Share

Over 5.0 Percent
lncrease
0-5.0 Percent
lncrease

b

States
Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New Jersey

41.2

Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia

0-5.0 Percent
Decrease

Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nor.th Carolina,
New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming

Over 5.0 Percent
Decrease

Alabama, Delaware, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maryland

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Per Capita Expenditures

State Grants-in-Aid

The sixth characteristic examined in Table 1 is
expenditure per capita. This measure is included to
capture the scope, rather than the division, of fiscal
responsibilities among States. In 1972, total per
capita expenditures by State and local governments
ranged from $2,147 in Alaska and $1,239 in New
York to $512 in Arkansas, with a 50-State average
of $795. Education accounts for the largest share
of this amount (40 percent), with highways following (14.2 percent). The four functions considered
together account for nearly three-fourths of total
1972 expenditures of State and local governments.
Using the average figures to provide a profile, the
average State spent $795 per capita in 1972 for all
functions - $3 18 on education, $ 1 13 on highways,
$82 for public welfare, $54 for health and hospitals,
and $228 for all other functions. Interstate variations in the level of per capita spending decreased
between 1967 and 1972 for education and highways,
but increased for the other specific functional areas
and for the total of State-local spending.

The seventh characteristic in Table 1 measures
State grants to local governments as a percent of
total State government expenditure and is geared to
separate State governments that dominate financing
into two groups: those that retain heavy direct expenditure responsibility and those that pass expenditure responsibility to localities via grant systems.
In 1972, State grants to local governments accounted for 57.4 percent of State government spending in New York but only 3.6 percent in Hawaii.
Grants as a share of total State government spending averaged 29.0 percent, but education expenditures accounted for three-fourths of the total dollar grants and welfare for another 17 percent.
If a trend is exhibited it is a slight one-directed
toward increased direct State financing and away
from use of grants-in-aid. The interstate variation
for this State grant ratio, however, is relatively
large, especially for highway and public welfare expenditures-functions for which the variability increased between 1967 and 1972. The increased vari-

ability in these functions, however, is offset by declines registered in health and hospitals and other
functional areas, so that the interstate variation for
total expenditures showed a slight decrease.
Revenue Effort
Revenue effort is defined as State plus locally
financed expenditure expressed as a percent of State
income.3 In 1972, this index for total expenditure
ranged from 32.9 percent in Alaska and 21.1 percent
in New York to 11.4 percent in Arkansas, with a 50State average of 15.9 percent. About half of the
revenue effort (7 percent) was devoted to providing
education. Over the 1967-1972 period, State revenue
effort increased about 13 percent, and about 40 percent of this increase may be attributed to education.
Interstate variations in tax effort also tended to

increase, not only for total expenditures but also
for the individual expenditure functions.
State Income Tax Share
The ninth fiscal characteristic depicted in Table
1 is the share of State and local government revenues accounted for by individual income taxes. This
variable is designed as a rough initial approximation
of the progressivity of State taxation systems. The
largest income tax share in 1972 was in Delaware,
where 30.4 percent of tax revenues were defived
from the individual income tax. Five States-Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming -received
no revenue from State or
local individual income taxes in 1972 compared
with 1 1 States in 1967. The individual income tax
accounted for an average of 13.0 percent of total

Table 3

Distribution of States by Change in State Direct Expenditure Share, 1967-1972

Over 5.0 Percent
Increase
0-5.0 Percent
Increase

Number of
States

Average 1967
Expenditure Share

5

48.1

Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Utah, Vermont

25

41.8

Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, West
Virginia, Wisconsin

States

0-5.0 Percent
Decrease

California, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Virginia, Washington,
Wyoming

Over 5.0 Percent
Decrease

Alaska, Arizona

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

State revenue in 1972, an increase from 9.2 percent
in 1967. The interstate variation of the income tax
ratio declined between 1967 and 1972, partly as a
result of the adoption of some form of individual
income tax by five additional States: Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, Nebraska, and Rhode Island.

States in which the local sector dominates financing relationships tend to
have a high ratio of State grants but
generally a low tax effort and low, income tax shares. No close relationship
with per capita expenditures is found.

STATE FISCAL PATTERNS

Expenditure Patterns

The 50 State fiscal systems described by the nine
characteristics exhibit innumerable and distinctive
combinations of intergovernmental relationships.
Some general patterns, however, also emerge, indicating that although each State may be unique, certain common types of State-local fiscal relationships
exist nonetheless.
The obvious relationships are that when one
governmental level dominates the financing share
of State expenditures, the other two governmental
sectors tend to have lower shares4 and that State
expenditure dominance is the obverse of locally
dominant responsibility; hence, the relationship between these latter two measures will be negative.
Among the more interesting interrelationships that
were found - by means of correlation analysis -are:

Financing Patterns
States marked by high Federal financing
shares also are characterized by high,
State, direct expenditure shares and low,
State, grant ratios. This pattern suggests
that such States tend to spend their
Federal grants directly rather than channel the funds to local governments. No
systematic relationship is found, however, between a high Federal financing
ratio and per capita expenditures, tax
effort, or income tax collections as a
share of State revenues (see Table 4).
States with a high State financing share
also have a higher direct expenditure
ratio, indicating a somewhat greater
tendency for these States to provide
services directly rather than to support
them at the local level via the grant-inaid mechanism. These States also are
found to have high per capita expenditures, high tax effort, and relatively larger income tax components of their revenue structures.

States characterized by high direct expenditure shares - in addition to having
high Federal and State, but low local,
financing shares -tend to be marked by
high tax effort and, as might be expected, a low reliance on State grants. No
close relationship is found, however,
between State direct expenditure shares
and either per capita expenditures or the.
income tax share of State revenues.
States in which local direct expenditure
responsibilities are high - in addition to
being characterized by high local and
low State and Federal financing shares are also marked by high State grant
reliance and tax effort. Again, no close
relationship is found with either per
capita expenditures or the income tax
factor.
These are some of the more general patterns
found to hold for States and their selected fiscal
characteristics. Although of general applicability,
these relationships do not imply cause and effect,
nor do they necessarily apply to each State. Thus,
the characterizations described, although of sufficient strength to rule out that they result solely
from chance factors, are not perfect-States can be
found that differ from the general pattern. For
example, the general tendency for States with high
financing ratios to have high State direct expenditure shares is the pattern found in Hawaii and most
other such States, but it is not true in Maryland,
where heavier than average reliance is placed on the
grant mechanism. When specific expenditure functions are added to the analysis, the pattern of classifications becomes far more complex: States exhibiting different levels of State dominance for different functions in the same fiscal classification
criterion. The systematic relationships among the
fiscal variables, and not the exceptions, however,
provide the basis for a State classification scheme.

Table 4

Correlations Among Fiscal Characteristics, 1972

1. Federal Financing Share
2. State Financing Share
3. Local Financing Share
4. State Direct Expenditure Share
5. Local Direct Expenditure Share
6. Per Capita Expenditures ($)
7. Grants as Share of State
Expenditures
8. Tax Effort 'Index
9. Income Tax Share of Revenues

2

3

4

5

6

.I44

-.676*
-.826*

.594*
.654*
-.826*

-.594*
-.654*
.826*
-1 .OOO*

065
.286*
-.I76
.204
-.204
-.

'Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Note: The larger the number, the stronger the relationship between characteristics. A negative sign indicates the characteristics move in opposite directions; a positive sign indicates they move in the same direction.

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various data sources.

Table 5

Correlations Between Fiscal Characteristics of States
and Social and Economic Variables, 1972

Per Capita
l ncorne

Percent
Urban

State
Population

Federal Financing Share
State Financing Share
Local Financing Share
State Direct Expenditure Share
Local Direct Expenditure Share
Per Capita Expenditures ($)
Grants as Share of State
Expenditures
'Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse Universitty. Calculated from various
data sources.

RELATING FISCAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS
These patterns of intergovernmental arrangement
can be analyzed further by exploring the relationship between fiscal variables and characteristics of
a State's population and economy.5 For example, is
a particular intergovernmental arrangement a common feature of the heavily industralized Northeastern and Central States that are generally acknowledged to be in the deepest fiscal trouble? Do
the richer States tend to be more State government
dominated? Are grants used more intensively in
more heavily urbanized States? Is there a tendency
for certain types of States, or States in certain
regions, to move toward further State government
dominance while other types are moving toward a
more balanced State-local partnership? The purpose
of this section is to determine whether or not a
systematic and identifiable relationship exists between fiscal arrangement and the geographic, social,
and economic characteristics of States.6
The results of this analysis show that there are
systematic relationships between financing and expenditure responsibilities and certain State characteristics (see Table 5 ) . States characterized by either
a high Federal financing share or a high, State, direct expenditure share tend to be poorer (in terms of

per capita income), more rural, and less populated.
States in which the local financing share or the local
direct expenditure share is high lean toward the opposite direction-richer, more urban, and more
populated. The States in which the State financing
share is high tend to be less populated, although
the relationship with both income and urbanization
factors is tenuous.

A CLASSIFICATION OF STATES
BY INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENT
Based on the analysis presented above, the 50
States are grouped into categories of high, moderate, and low financing responsibilities, expenditure
shares, and per capita spending levels. These groupings may be cross-classified into three major types
of State-local fiscal systems: The first group of
States is characterized by State government domination in terms of both expenditure responsibility
and origin of financing - Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii,
Vermont, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. The second group
of States are dominated by local government and
exhibit low State financing and expenditure responsibilities-California, Nevada, New York, Kansas, Indiana, Missouri, New Jersey, and Ohio. The
remaining States are mixed, in that their fiscal sys-

Table 6

Classification of State Fiscal Systems:
Total Expenditures of State and Local Governments, 1972
High State
Expenditure
Responsibility
High State Financing Responsibility
High Expenditure Per Capita
..

Moderate State
Expenditure
Responsibility

Low State
Expenditure
Responsibility

Alaska
Delaware
Hawaii
Vermont

2

Moderate Expenditure Per Capita

. Rhode Island
Utah
West Virginia

Low Expenditure Per Capita

Arkansas
Kentucky
Oklahoma

Moderate State Financing Responsibility
High Expenditure Per Capita

Louisiana
New Mexico
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Connecticut
Washington

Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Wisconsin

Moderate Expenditure Per Capita

Maine
Montana
North Dakota

Colorado
Georgia
Oregon
Pennsylvania

Arizona
l owa

Low Expenditure Per Capita

Alabama
l daho

Tennessee
Virginia

Florida

Massachusetts
Wyoming

California
Nevada
New York

Moderate Expenditure Per Capita

Illinois
Nebraska
New Hampshire
South Dakota

Kansas
New Jersey

Low Expenditure Per Capita

Texas

l ndiana
Missouri
Ohio

Low State Financing Responsibility
High Expenditure Per Capita

Notes: High, moderate, and low designations for each category relate to whether the State placed in the top 15, middle 20, or bottom 15
among States.
State expenditure responsibility is the State share of total State and local direct expenditures.
State financial responsibility is the share of total State and local expenditures financed by the State.
Per capita expenditures is total State and local expenditures per capita.

Soyrce: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Table 7

Classification of State Fiscal Systems:
Nonwelfare Expenditures of State and Local Governments, 1972
High State
Expenditure
Responsibility
High State Financing Responsibility
High Expenditure Per Capita

Moderate State
Expenditure
Responsibility

Low State
Expenditure
Responsibility

Alaska
Delaware
Hawaii
Vermont

Moderate Expenditure Per Capita

l daho
Utah
West Virginia

Louisiana
New Mexico

Low Expenditure Per Capita

Kentucky
South Carolina

Arkansas
Mississippi
North Carolina
Oklahoma

Montana
Wyoming

Arizona
Maryland
Oregon
Washington

Minnesota
Wisconsin

Moderate Expenditure Per Capita

North Dakota
New Hampshire

Connecticut
Pennsylvania

Florida

Low Expenditure Per Capita

Maine
Rhode Island

Alabama
Georgia
Tennessee
Virginia

Iowa

Moderate State Financing Responsibility
High Expenditure Per Capita

Low State Financing Responsibility
High Expenditure Per Capita:

Moderate Expenditure Per Capita

Low Expenditure Per Capita

California
Nevada
New York
Colorado
Kansas
Nebraska
South Dakota

Illinois
l ndiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mi.ssouri
New Jersey
Ohio
Texas

Notes: High, moderate, and low designations for each category relate to whether the State placed in the top 15, middle 20, or bottom 15
among States.
State expenditure responsibility is the State share of total State and local direct expenditures.
State financial responsibility isathe share of total State and local expenditures financed by the State.
Per capita expenditures is total State and local expenditures per capita.
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Average Characteristics of States with Differing Fiscal Arrangements, 1972

Number of States
Average Per Capita Income
Average Population
(Millions, 1970)
Average Percent Urban

All States

State Government
Dominated

50
$4,255
4.1 6

9
$4,136
1.35

53.2

39.6

Shared
Responsibility

Local Government
Dominated

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Government Finances in 1971-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1973; U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1973; and Table 7 .

tems show a more balanced responsibility between
State and local units. These three groupings of financial-expenditure categories are subdivided further on
the basis of per capita expenditures.
This classification scheme is presented for both
total State and local expenditures (Table 6) and all
expenditures, other than public welfare (Table 7).
The latter classification is designed to adjust for
the effects of the peculiar pattern of assignment of
public assistance programs responsibility. The bulk
of financing for public assistance is Federal, and
States may elect to administer or supervise their
public assistance programs. If they choose to administer public assistance, States have expenditure
responsibility; if they choose to supervise programs,
counties (or their counterparts in some States) have
expenditure responsibility.
Because the financing-expenditure relationships
in public welfare are not typical of other functional
areas and because welfare is a relatively prominent
component of State-local expenditures, exclusion
of this category gives a clearer picture of the more
general patterns of State-local fiscal arrangement.
Michigan illustrates the manner in which the welfare function may distort these relationships. In
terms of total expenditures, Michigan has a high
State expenditure responsibility, a moderate State
financing responsibility, and a high level of per capita expenditures. When public welfare expenditures
are excluded, however, Michigan exhibits low State
responsibility for both financing and expenditures,
and a moderate level of per capita expenditure. In
other words, Michigan has a locally dominated
State fiscal system except for public welfare expenditures, which are heavily State dominated.
Michigan also has a moderate level of per capita

expenditure for nonwelfare functions, but a relatively high level of per capita expenditure on public
welfare; thus, its overall per capita expenditure
level places Michigan among the highest 15 States.
On the basis of nonwelfare State and local expenditures, 1 1 States -California, Nevada, New
York, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey. Ohio, and Texas-can be
characterized as local government dominated. These
States tend to be more populous, more urban, and
have higher per capita incomes than the U.S. average (see Table 8). Indeed, these local government
dominated States tend to be more than twice as
large (in terms of population) than the national
average, almost half again more urban, and with a
12 percent higher level of income. Furthermore,
these 1 1 local government dominated States include
those States with urban centers having major fiscal
problems (Cleveland, Detroit, Newark, New York);
they have seven of the ten largest cities in the United States; and they account for 55 percent of total
State and local government expenditures.
The State government dominated States -Alaska,
Delaware, Hawaii, Vermont, Idaho, Utah, West
Virginia, Kentucky, and South Carolina -generally
tend to be, on the other hand, more rural, less populated, and below the U.S. average per capita income. Their average income is 3 percent below that
for the nation, their population size is one-third
that of the average State, and they are only threefourths as urban. These States also are dominated
much less by big cities. In fact, these nine States
have no cities among the 30 largest in the country
and only two among the 50 largest.
The remaining. 30 States, which share responsibility between the State and local levels of govern-

ment, exhibit great diversity in terms of population
size, income, and level of urbanization but generally
stand below the national average for these three
characteristics.

SUMMARY
This chapter has differentiated States in terms of
intergovernmental financial and expenditure responsibilities. The results indicate that considerable differences exist among the 5 0 States in their patterns of
intergovernmental arrangement. Using nine separate
fiscal indices, patterns are found among financing,
expenditure, and other fiscal characteristics. In addition, State financing and expenditure ratios are linked
to socioeconomic characteristics such as income,
population size, and urbanization.
The State classification scheme not only delineates
the diversity of fiscal arrangements among the 5 0
States but also provides a basis for assessing various
questions concerning the effects of the Federal grant
system on the State-local sector It seems clear,
even at this stage of the analysis, that if a Federal
grant program is to resolve effectively the diverse
problems of these groups of States, their diverse fiscal systems must be taken into consideration.
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FOOTNOTES
'All data were collected from various volumes of the 1967 and
1972 Census o f Governments or from annual publications of
the Governments Division of the Census Bureau for these two
years. The specific variables and their sources are listed in the
references to this chapter.
%he interstate variations are presented in the parentheses in
Table 1.
3 ~ e v e n u eeffort is calculated by taking the sum of the State and
local financing percentage and multiplying this ratio bq per
capita expenditures. This yields the contribution to expenditure
from own-sources, which is then expressed as a ratio of per
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local financing shares and the State and local financing shares.
It does not, however. occur between the Federal and State financing shares, although this relationship is not statistically
significant: that is, it is not systematic and simply may be due
to chance.
5 ~ as first step. the 50 States have been ranked according to
each variable for total expenditures and for expenditures in
each of the four specific functions-education. highways, public
welfare, and health and hospitals-for 1967 and 1972. (See the
references to this chapter.)
%he statistical procedures used are correlation analysis and
analysis of variance. The variance analysis addresses the question of whether States with similar levels of socioeconomic factors have the same level of fiscal arrangement. The correlation
analysis determines the strength (or weakness) of this relationship as well as its direction (positive or negative).

Chapter 111

A Classification of and
Participation in the
Federal Grant System
Among the many topics of continuing controversy in the grant impact literature, two are particularly prominent. Despite numerous theoretical
and empirical studies, disagreement still exists about
whether Federal grants stimulate or substitute for
State and local spending in the aggregate or in specific expenditure functions. Controversy also persists
concerning the influence that matching requirements
and certain other grant cha-racteristics have on State
and local fiscal behavior.
To answer these and other questions about the
impact of Federal grants, a typology of Federal
grant programs is presented. Using this classification scheme, the level of participation of States in
various types of grant programs then is examined.

A TYPOLOGY OF FEDERAL
GRANT PROGRAMS
Most Federal grant programs have some form of
State or local matching requirement that changes
the effective price at which State or local governments purchase grant-aided goods and services. In
response to this price change, State and local governments may take any one of a number of actions.
For example, they may increase spending on the
aided functions and in the aggregate; they may decrease or hold constant spending on the aided function but increase spending in the aggregate; or they

may substitute Federal for local funds and spend
less on the aided function and in the aggregate. If
State and local governments increase their spending
in response to Federal grants, the grants are said to
be stimulative. If State and local governments decrease their spending in response to Federal grants,
the grants are said to be substitutive.
The level of the matching requirement determines
the degree of price subsidy and, therefore, has
important implications for the State-local expenditure response. Several other salient characteristics
of grant programs, including the allocation criteria
(formula or project basis), the primary recipient
unit (State or local), and the dollar magnitude of
the Federal program, also may affect the spending
response of State and local governments. Aside from
grant characteristics, this expenditure response is
also related to the sensitivity of State and local governments to price and income changes induced by
the Federal grant. Because of the latter factors,
grants of the same type but in different program
areas can yield different effects (stimulative or substitutive) at the State-local level.
Methodology
At present, no regularly published data tabulate
Federal grants according to the various grant characteristics. Because the ultimate purpose of this

grant classification, is to analyze the impact of Federal grants on State and local governments, the
prime requirement is a data source that describes
allocations from relatively detailed grant categories
among recipient government units. The available
data closest to the type desired are the annual
U.S. Department of the Treasury publications, Federal Aid to States, in which Federal aid is disaggregated into 100 expenditure appropriation categories that contain one or more individual grant
programs. These data are based on Federal disbursement by State area, and thus no distinction
is made between aid to State governments and aid
to local governments.
Several steps are required to determine the grant
type of each aid category. First, the more than 1,000
Federal grant programs listed in the 1972 Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance are divided into two
groups: grants for which State or local governments are eligible and all other grants and forms of
assistance. Grants to State and local governments
are then allocated among the 100 categories in the
1972 Federal Aid to States volume on the basis of
program name, program authorization, and grant
purpose as specified in the Catalog. Second, the
appropriation totals for all programs in each category are compared with the disbursement totals of
the categories. If the two numbers are less than 10
percent apart, the category is assumed to consist
of these programs.2 In this manner, it is possible to
identify the constituent programs in 84 of the 100
categories; these 84 categories account for $32.9
billion of $35.9 billion in total 1972 disbursements (approximately 93 percent).
The next step in the procedure is to classify the
individual programs in the 84 identified categories
as project or formula grants according to the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. If at least 80
percent of the appropriations total in each category
is for either project or formula grants, the category
was so classified. If this criterion was not satisfied,
the category was labeled as mixed. Twenty of the 84
identified categories were formula grants, 55 categories were project grants, and the remaining nine
categories were mixed formula and project grants.
To identify matching requirements of programs,
the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance is used.
Categories are classified as having high, low, or nomatching requirements; a high State-local matching
ratio is defined as being at least 50 percent of expenditures. The State-local matching requirement
could not be labeled for two of the 75 project and

formula categories because their matching requirements varied with local economic and demographic
characteristics.
Finally, the 75 formula and project categories are
classified by primary recipient level of government State or local-according to unpublished data collected by the Governments Division of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 3
An attempt is made to identify grant categories
by their program eligibility criteria, but these criteria did not appear to curtail significantly the degree of State-local participation in Federal programs. Only six of the 100 grant categories analyzed
had fewer than 15 States participating, and these
categories accounted for less than 1 percent of
total Federal payments to States in fiscal 1972. The
most significant eligibility feature is whether the
potential recipient is a State or local government,
and this information is included in the typology.
By these various steps then, Federal grants accounting for approximately $35.9 billion in aid are
grouped according to matching requirements, level of
recipient government, and allocation basis (formula
or project).
The Federal Grant Typology
Several interesting findings emerge from this
grant classification analysis. Looking at the formula
versus project dimension first, the 55 grant categories that fall into the project grant classification
accounted for $7.5 billion in aid in 1972 or less than
one-fourth of the t ~ t a lfunding (see Table 9). Although more numerous, project grants are clearly
less significant in dollar terms. Of these 55 project
grant categories, 36 were received primarily by the
State but only accounted for 40 percent of the total
project grant receipts. Twenty of the 36 project
grants received .primarily by the States had no
matching requirements, 12 had a low match, and
four had a high State-local matching ratio.
Of equal interest is the fact that about one-third
of total project grant programs but about 60 percent of total project grant funding are direct Federal-to-local grants. Of these 19 project grant categories, six had high, eight had low, and four had
no matching ratios. Indeed, 75 percent of the project grant dollars primarily received by local governments had low matching, and an additional 1 1
percent had no matching requirements. Stated somewhat differently, 44 of the 55 project grant categories (State and local) had either no or low match-

Table 10

Federal Grant Typology, 1972, Nonconstruction Grants
(Number of Grants and Dollar Amounts (in Millions) by Type)
High State-Local
Matching Requirement

Low State-Local
Matching Requirement

No State-Local
Matching Requirement

Undetermined
State-Local
Matching Requirement

Totals

#
Formula Grants
Primarily to States
Primarily to Local
Governments
Subtotal
Project Grants
Primarily to States
Primarily to Local
Governments
Subtotal
Mixed and Unclassified
TOTAL
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 1972 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1972; and U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Aid to States, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1973.
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ing requirements, and these 44 accounted for 90
percent of all project funds.
Of the 20 formula grant categories, 11 were low
matching and four required no matching; these 15
formula grants accounted for more than 95 percent of all formula grant dollars. Classified according to recipient, formula grants predominantly are
given to State governments- 18 of the 20 program
categories and $23.9 billion of the $24.7 billion in
formula grant funding.
Perhaps the most striking finding of this crossclassification is the large dollar amount of lowmatching formula grants to States -$21.0 billion.
This single grant type accounts for 65 percent of the
funds allocated to the 75 classified categories; all
other grant types combined account for only 35
percent of this total. The characteristics of each of
the 75 grant categories in 1972 were applied to the
corresponding category from the 1967 Federal Aid
to States volume. The objective was to assess the
growth of grant amounts by type of grant and recipient. It is assumed that the type of grants in each
program category did not change substantially between 1967 and 1972.4
The results for 1967 exhibit a pattern similar to
that established for 1972, with one notable exception (see Table 11). Although formula grants accounted for about two-thirds of total funding in
both years, the proportion of funding under programs with identifiable matching requirements
rose from 70 percent in 1967 to 77 percent in 1972.
To the extent the matching provision results in
fiscal stimulation, one might expect to find greater
price effects in the later year. In both years, however, the bulk of Federal dollars fell into the lowmatching category.
The 20 individual formula grant categories identified for 1972 are presented on page 42 with the total
dollar value of check; issued in each category for
fiscal years 1967 and 1972, the matching requirements, and the primary recipient levels. The same
information for the 55 individual project grant
categories is presented on page 40.
In summary, this grant typology highlights the
differentiated nature of Federal grants. It directs
attention to salient characteristics of these grants
and reveals that:
Project grants are more numerous but
formula grants have greater funding;
.The majority of aid is provided to the
State, rather than local, sector; and

Most of the Federal aid carries a low or
no-matching ratio.
These results are in substantial accord with the
findings of this Commission's analysis of Federal
grants in 1967.5 In that year, the Commission tabulated 379 Federal grants and a total of $12.6 billion
in aid to State and local governments. Project
grants numbered 280 (nearly three-fourths of the
grants), but only $2.8 billion (22 percent) pf the
total aid was provided by this grant type.6 The
Commission study found that direct Federal-local
grants - mainly of recent origin -were a gro-wing,
but still small, cpmponent of the Federal aid system. There were 68 grant programs under which
funds could be paid to local units of government,
and for 12 of these programs, local governments
were the sole recipients.
Further paralleling the grant typology presented was the Commission's finding on the matching funds issue. Only seven Federal grants called
for more than 50 percent State-local matching while
148 had no-match provisions, The remaining grants
exhibited a wide variety of matching ratios, virtually
all of which fall into the low-match category.
The prime purpose of this grant typology, however, is to facilitate a more disaggregated analysis
of the effects of different types of Federal grants
on the State-local sector. Combined with the classification of States presented in the previous chapter,
this grant disaggregation permits a more careful
investigation of the interrelationship between Federal grants and State-local government fiscal arrangement. With these two building blocks -classification of States and Federal grant typology-it is
possible to assess, on a comparative basis, the basic
question underlying this study: What difference, if
any, does the grant form make?

PARTICIPATION I N FEDERAL
GRANT PROGRAMS
The impact of Federal grants on State and local
government fiscal behavior can be studied from at
least two basic perspectives. The more frequently
followed approach emphasizes the State and local
government expenditure response to Federal grant
receipts. This is normally referred to as "impact
analysis" and is the subject of Chapter IV.
A second approach examines the grant response
of States having different fiscal and economic characteristics to grant programs of different types.

Table 11

Federal Grant Typology, 1967
(Number of Grants and Dollar Amounts (in Millions) by Type)
High State-Local
Matching Requirement

Low State-Local
Matching Requirement

No State-Local
Matching Requirement

Undetermined
State-Local
Matching Requirement

Totals
$

Formula Grants
Primarily to States
Primarily to Local
Governments
Subtotal
Project Grants
Primarily to States
Primarily to Local
Governments
Subtotal
Mixed and Unclassified
TOTAL
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 1967 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1968; and U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Aid to States, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Governmefit Printing Office) 1968.

Table 12

Federal Grant Typology, 1967, Nonconstruction Grants
(Number of Grants and Dollar .Amounts (In Millions) by Type)
High State-Local
Matching Requirement

Low State-Local
Matching Requirement

No State-Local
Matching Requirement

Undetermined
State-Local
Matching Requirement

Totals

#
Formula Grants
Primarily t o States
Primarily t o Local
Governments

Subtotal
Project Grants
Primarily t o States
Primarily t o Local
Governments

Subtotal
Mixed and Unclassified
TOTAL
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 1967 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1967. U.S. Depart:
ment of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1968.
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This second set of concerns is termed "participation analysis" and is designed to answer the question: Do certain types of States tend to participate
in certain types of grants?
State and local governments may participate
in Federal grant programs in three ways. First,
grant allocation may be on a formula basis with
no matching required (e.g., School Assistance in
Federally Affected Areas). Second, if some degree
of matching is required, the State must fund its
share of the financing and accept the program conditions. In this case, participation is not a matter
of automatic entitlement. Third, the grant may be
of the project type, which requires the submission
of detailed plans (e.g., Rural Water and Waste Disposal Grants or EPA Construction Grants), and,
hence, the State or local government must elect to
participate to receive the grant.
In the first participation manner, all State and
local governments participate according to formula; thus, differential participation results from
either the State or locality having a greater or lesser
share of the factors used to apportion the grant or
grant eligibility conditions. Participation does not,
however, result from choice.
In the second case, the State-local sector volunteers to participate by accepting the program conditions and providing State-local resources. State and
local choice is greatest regarding project grants,
for which the grantsmanship phenomenon is marked; in this case, jurisdictions actively seek outside
assistance for programs in which the dollar magnitudes are not predetermined.
In the,latter cases, however, the amount of grant
receipts may result simply from the level of spending in the State rather than from the State or local

response to the grant design. That is, if the grant
is close-ended and the State would have spent more
than the matching amount in the absence of the
grant, interstate variations in participation are primarily the result of the intended level of State and
local spending for the aided function7 and not
necessarily related to grant features.
This analysis of interstate variations in the per
capita level of grant receipts differs from previous
studies in two important ways. First, grants are not
treated as an aggregate but rather are considered
simply as different programs with varying inducements for participation. Second, because of this disaggregation, it is possible to study the net effect of
variations on grant design and variations in intergovernmental arrangements on grant participation. The grant types considered are project grants,
formula grants, grants to State governments, grants
to local governments, high-matching grants, lowmatching grants, and no-matching grants. These
aggregates reflect the grant characteristics generally
considered as important influences on the level of
State and local government participation.8

The Pattern of Federal Grant Distribution
Because of increased grant allocations, participation by State and local governments in Federal
grant programs has steadily grown in magnitude.
Over the 1967- 1972 period, the average level of per
capita Federal grants for the 50 States rose 65
percent from $99.70 to $165.02 (see Table 13).
Variation among States in per capita Federal grant
receipts, however, dropped by about half, indicating
that, over this period, structural changes have taken

Table 13

Federal Grant Participation by State and Local Governments
1972

1967

Per Capita Federal Grants
Federal Grants as a Percent
of Total State and Local
Government Expenditures

Mean

Coefficient
of Variation

Mean

Coefficient
of Variation

$99.70

.74

$165.02

.41

19.4%

.33

i, ,%

.23

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments, 1967, Vol. 4, No. 5 , Compendium of Government Finances (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1969; Census of Governments, 1972, Vol. 4, No. 5 , Compendium of Government Finances
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1974.

Table 14

Simple Correlations of Per Capita Federal Grants and Income,
Urbanization, and Population Size
Per Capita
Income

1.972
1967
1962
1942

1 348
.0892
.0720
.3063*

Urbanization
-. I982

-.2037
-.0058
-.0745

Population

-.2314
-.2868*
-.369O*
-.2839*

"Significant at 5 percent level of confidence.

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

place in the grant aggregate. These structural
changes tended to favor somewhat the higher income States while decreasing slightly, but not reversing, the long established tendency of the Federal
grant system - favoring States with smaller populations (see Table 14).
Interstate Variations in the
Level of Per Capita Grants

As noted, interstate variations in grant receipt
levels may reflect either formula intent, formula
bias (for example, due to intergovernmental arrangement), or grant design inducements. Quantitative separation of these three factors, however, is
very difficult. Formula intent is not always clear
from the legislation or its history, while the elements of grant design are sometimes subjective and,
therefore, not readily amenable to measurement.
Because of these difficulties, the approach adopted examines the aggregate relationship between
grants on a per capita basis and certain needs factors. Attention then shifts to the components of the
grant system to identify the effects of varying grant
designs on participation. Finally, differences among
States according to intergovernmental arrangement
classifications are considered.
Total Grant Distribution

The distribution of Federal grants among States
generally has been treated in the aggregate (total
grants) and most often has been analyzed in
terms of its equalization potential.9 There has
been some disagreement, however, about what the

system intends to equalize - fiscal capacity (usually
measured by per capita income) or service levels.
If the former, the grant potential was found to be
limited. lo If the latter, it then becomes necessary to
define interstate variations in needs. For purposes
of this analysis, the Federal grant system is assessed
in terms of its tendency to equalize needs, with
needs roughly approximated by per capita income,
percent of population living in urban areas, and
population size (the latter to determine the presence,
or absence, of any scale effects).
Correlations were made between each grant type
and the three measures of needs to determine if certain types of States tend to specialize in certain
types of grants (see Table 15). The results show that
where systematic relationships were found between
per capita grants of various types and the three
needs measures, the direction of the linkage generally was inverse; that is, high income, highly urban, and more populated States tend to participate
less in the grant system than do their poorer, more
rural, and less populated counterparts. 1 1 Only two
direct - and systematic - relationships were found:
Between low-matching formula grants
to local governments and urbanization,
indicating that the more urban States
tend to participate more heavily in this
grant type; and
Between high-matching project grants to
local governments and per capita income, suggesting that the richer States
tend to participate to a greater extent
than their less affluent counterparts in
this form of grant.

Table 15

Correlation Coefficients of Social and Economic Variables with
Per Capita Federal Grants to States, by Grant Classification, 1972
Grant Type

Per Capita
lncome

Percent
Urban

Population

Formula Grants
Project Grants
Grants to State Governments
Grants to Local Governments
High-Matching Grants
Low-Matching Grants
No-Matching Grants
High-Matching Formula Grants to States
Low-Matching Formula Grants to States
No-Matching Formula Grants to States
Undetermined Formula Grants to States
Low-Matching Formula Grants to Local Governments
No-Matching Formula Grants to Local Governments
High-Matching Project Grants to States
Low-Matching Project Grants to States
No-Matching Project Grants to States
High-Matching Project Grants to Local Governments
Low-Matching Project Grants to Local Governments
No-Matching Project Grants to Local Governments
Undetermined Project Grants to Local Governments
Low-Matching Project Grants to State and Local
Governments
'Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Of the three needs factors, urbanization and population size tended to be more frequently related
i;l a systematic way with various grant types than
was per capita income. The strength of the relationship'? was generally modest (0.3 or 0.4), although
particularly strong linkages were found between
high-matching formula grants to States and income
(-,8327); high-matching grants and urbanization
(-.5509); high-matching formula grants to States and
urbanization (-.5908); and undetermined formula
grants to States and population size (-.5798).
These findings must be tempered, however, by
the fact that the focus of attention has been the
different grant types rather than the particular
grant program. Thus, the relationships found need
not hold true for different types of grants within
particular functional areas.

Because the amount of grants received reflects
both formula intent and the voluntary or choice
aspect implied by participation, it cannot be taken
as a clear measure of either. The voluntary aspect
of grant participation can be approximated by using
the needs factors - income, urbanization, and population size- to estimate an expected level of grant
participation. This expected level, estimated by
multiple regression analysis, can then be compared
to the actual level of participation, with the difference between estimated and actual participation
used as a rough measure of the degree of Statelocal voluntaryism. Because the three needs factors
provide only a partial explanation of interstate
variations in grant receipts, however, the estimated
grant participation is only a rough approximation;
hence, the difference between estimated and actual-

the voluntary participation measure.- must also be
viewed as a rough measure.
The results of this procedure show that income,
urbanization, and population size frequently are
systematically related to per capita grant receipts
for grants of various types. Holding population and
urbanization constant, higher income States can be
expected to participate more in grant programs and
'the results confirm this expectation. This means
that after accounting for the influence of population size and urbanization, per capita income is
closely, and directly, linked to most types of grant
programs -except for high-matching grants and
total grants to State governments (see Table 16).
More urbanized States tend to participate less for
each grant type used in this analysis, and, in each
case, the relationship is systematic. Larger States
also tend, in general, to participate less, although
the relationship with project grants, high-matching
grants, and grants to local governments is not suf-

ficiently strong to exclude the possibility that the
negative sign is merely due to chance.
These patterns generally held for all types of
grants. Nonetheless, the three needs factors tend to
explain only about 20 to 25 percent of the interstate variation in grant participation. This finding
indicates that other factors, not "accounted for in
this analysis, also affect the grant participation
process. Thus, the difference between estimated and
actual grant participation -used here to measure
high versus low voluntary participation -must be
viewed only as a first approximation rather than a
definitive conclusion. For example, with regard to
formula grants, New York State would have an
expected value of $95.64 per capita, according to
the multiple regression analysis between per c ~ p i t a
formula grants and income, urbanization, and population. The actual figure, however, was only $55.52
in 1972. This much lower level of aid might be
viewed-at least tentatively-as relatively low par-

Table 16

Grant Needs Indicators by Type-sf Grant, 1972, Regression Results
(F-Values in Parentheses)

Grant Type

R2

Independent Variables

Dependent Variable
Per Capita
lncome

Population
in Thousands

Percent
Urban

Total Federal Grants
Nonwelfare Federal Grants
Project
Formula
Total Matching
High Matching
Low Matching
Grants to State Governments
Grants to Local Governments
"Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Table 17

Classification of States by Participation in Various Types of Federal Grant Programs
Type of Grants

High Participation1

Low Participation2

Project

Arizona, California, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Wyoming, Alaska, Maryland,
Ohio, Arkansas, Oklahoma

Illinois, Indiana, lowa, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina,
Utah, Wisconsin, Vermont

Formula

California, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas,
Wyoming, West Virginia, Alaska

Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, lowa,
Montana, Nevada, New York, Utah,
Wisconsin, Illinois

State Recipient

Alaska, California, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New
York, Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming

Connecticut, Indiana, lowa, Kansas,
Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Vermont, Wisconsin

Local Recipient

Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Arizona

Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Utah,
Wisconsin, West Virginia

High Matching

Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania

Connecticut, Georgia, lowa, Missouri,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, West Virginia, Wisconsin

Low Matching

Alaska, California, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, West
Virginia, Wyoming, Tennessee

Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
lowa, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New
York, Wisconsin

No-Matching

Alaska, California, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Texas,
West Virginia, Wyoming, Tennessee

Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
lowa, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New
York, Wisconsin

'Ten States with the largest positive residuals.
2Ten States with the largest negative residuals.
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

ticipation. Kentucky, on the other hand, was expected to receive $61.95 but actually received $89.37
and might be viewed as a relatively high participation State in formula grant programs.
Although these results must be viewed as tentative, they do suggest that although some States,
such as California, Minnesota, New Jersey, and
Alaska, are consistently in the high participation
category, other States appear much less frequently.
The same is true for States falling in the low participation classification. Thus, for at least some
States, differences exist in participation response
for the various grant types (see Table 17).
This regression analysis also can be used to determine if the different types of grants interact differentially with the three needs factors. In this regard, the greatest variations are associated with the
urbanization factor, indicating that a one per-

centage point increase in urbanization is associated
with a decrease of 12 cents in high-matching grants
up to a decrease of $2.22 for total grants. A change
in either population or income will also affect the
per capita receipts from various grant types, but
these differences tend to be rather small.

The Effects of
Intergovernmental Arrangement
The second question regarding grant participation
is if the nature of the State fiscal system (i.e., fiscal
arrangement) differentially affects the per capita
level of various types of Federal grants. To determine the degree to which fiscal arrangement characteristics and per capita levels of 21 grant types are
related, a correlation analysis was performed (see
Table 18).

Table 18

Correlation Coefficients of State Fiscal Characteristics with Per Capita Federal Grants to States,
by Grant Classification, 1972

Grant Type
Formula Grants
Project Grants
Grants to State Governments
Grants to Local Governments
High-Matching Grants
Low-Matching Grants
No-Matching Grants
High-Matching Formula Grants to States
Low-Matching Formula Grants to States
No-Matching Formula Grants to States
Undetermined Formula Grants to States
Low-Matching Formula Grants to Local Governments
No-Matching Formula Grants to Local Governments
High-Matching Project Grants to States
Low-Matching Project Grants to States
No-Matching Project Grants to States
High-Matching Project Grants to Local Governments
Low-Matching Project Grants to Local Governments
No-Matching Project Grants to Local Governments
Undetermined Project Grants to Local Governments
Low-Matching Project Grants to State and Local
Governments

Federal
Financing
Share

State
Financing
Share

Local
Financing
Share

State Share
of Total Direct
Expenditures

Per Capita
Expenditures

Grants as a
Share of State
Expenditures

.6541
.7O99
.5656*
.7716*
.4029*
.6965
.5638*
-.3398*
.6646*
.O6l6
,4824*
-.0671
.7981
.4307*
.I255
.5106*
.7472
.6969
.I222
-.I834
.7747

-.3342
-.2921*
-.3192*
-.2637*
-.I637
-.3625*
-.2077
-.0892
-.3586*
-.0712
-.5362*
-.0432
-.2439*
-.4385*
-.I975
-.I791
-.0181
-.2816*
-.0728
-.3032*
-.2221

.SO63
.4742*
.4812*
.4380
.4420
.5571
.3ll8*
.3@49*
.5311
,1087
.5785*
-.0259
.3847*
.4969*
.4153*
.2242
1731
.4504*
.2413*
.3645
.3470*

"Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various data sources.

Table 19

Per Capita Grants by Type of Grant
Project
Grants

Formula
Grants

$

$

Matching
Grants

HighMatching
Grants

LowMatching
Grants

$

$

$

127.23
70.74
84.32

11.29
7.38
8.95

115.95
63.36
75.36

d

State Dominated
Local Dominated
Shared

58.04
30.57
39.57

106.67
60.00
76.58

*

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Table 20

Regression of Grants Per Capita and Selected Explanatory Variables

l ntercept Dummies
Grant
TYpe

Per Capita
Income

Total
Project
Formula
Matching
High
Matching
Zero
Matching

Percent
Urban

Population

l nteraction
Dummies with
Population

State
Dominance

Local
Dominance

State
Dominance

Local
Dominance

63.61
(1.49)
20.72
(1.39)
42.88
(1.48)
61.48"
(2.22)
5.66"
(3.76)

-53.95
(1.29)
-23.52
(1.62)
-30.42
(1.08)
-25.89
(0.96)
-1.07
(0.73)

-0.02
(1.11)
-0.01
(0.76)
-0.02
(1.24)
-0.02
(1.42)
-0.01 "
(2.94)

0.01
(1.61)
0.01
(1.64)
0.01
(1.54)
0.0 1
(1.32)
0.00
(0.77)

R2
.34

.31
.35
.40
.52

'Significant at 5 percent level.
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

These results show a close and positive relationship between nearly all types of Federal grant receipts and the Federal financing share. This relationship is to be expected, because Federal grants
are included in the Federal financial sharemeasure. However, Federal grant receipts also are generally positively related to the State financial share,
the State share of total direct expenditures, and the
State-local level of per capita expenditures (which
also partially include Federal grant receipts). Negative associations were found between Federal grant
receipts and both the local financing share and
grants as a share of State expenditures variables.
In general then, the correlations show that as Federal grant receipts increase, the Federal financial
share, State financial share, level of per capita expenditures, and State share of total direct expenditures tend to increase, while State reliance on the
grant mechanism and the local financing share
tend to decrease.
It should be emphasized that these correlation
results, however, are not meant to imply a cause
and effect relationship. Indeed, in the present context, this implication would be particularly perilous,
because both the Federal grant receipts by type of
grant and the various measures of fiscal arrangement
have been found to be related to the common set of
socioeconomic factors -income, urbanization, and
population size.
To determine the independent influence of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements, the State dominant-local dominant characterization (used in the
State classification scheme) along with the income,
urbanization, and population size variables were
used in a multiple regression analysis to explain
variations among States in different types of Federal
grant receipts. That the various classifications of
States differ in their per capita receipts for various
grant types is clear (see Table 19). Indeed for each
grant type presented -project, formula, matching,
high-matching, and low-matching grants -the Statedominated fiscal systems receive the highest per
capita levels, the locally dominated systems the
least (between one-half to two-thirds of the State
dominant per capita levels), with the shared responsibility States being intermediate - much closer,
however, to local than to State-dominated systems.
What is not clear, however, is whether these State
differences result from intergovernmental arrangement per se, population characteristics, or other
socioeconomic, political, or institutional factors of
the 50 States.

The results of the multiple regression analysis suggest that, after taking account of the three population traits, State dominant systems generally receive more per capita of the various grant types
than do the other State classifications ($64 more
per capita for total grants; $21 for project grants;
$43 for formula grants; $61 for matching grants;
$6 for high-matching - grants; and $183. less for nomatching grants). States in which the local sector
is the dominant partner uniformly receive lesser
amounts per capita for various grant types ($54
for total grants; $24 for project grants; $30 for formula grants; $26 for matching grants; $1 for highmatching grants; and $163 less for no-matching
grants) (see Table 20). There also appears to be a
tendency for grants to be distributed to less populated States within State-dominated systems but to
the larger States in locally dominated systems.

Summary

4

.

At this point, it may be helpful to summarize the
conclusions regarding participation in the Federal
grant system. First, the per capita amounts of various grant types were found to be associated with income, urbanization, and population size of States.
The strength of these interrelationships between per
capita receipts from various grant types did not differ substantially with regard to either per capita
income or population size. However, a greater
variability exists in connection with urbanization.
Using these three needs factors as a basis for
predicting grant receipts and comparing this predicted value with actual grant receipts tentatively
established that the different types of grants do
tend to call forth different degrees of participation
in different States -neither the high participating
States nor the low participating States are consistent for the different grant forms. For example,
California appears to be a high participator in six
of the seven grant classifications, while Iowa appears equally as often as a low participator. Nonetheless, different States appear in the top and bottom ten for the different grant types.
This differential participation also was found to
be related to the intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in the States, apart from the influence of
population size, income, and urbanization. Statedominated systems tend to participate more in most
forms of Federal grants, while locally dominated fiscal systems tend to participate less.

Table 27

Federal Grant Typology, Project Grants
Federal Disbursement
(in Thousands)
Grant Category
Department of Agriculture
Agricultural Marketing Servicemeat and poultry inspection
Grants for Scientific Research
National Forest and School Funds1
National Grasslands1
Removal of Surplus Agricultural Commodities2
Rural Water and Waste Disposal Grants*
Watershed Protection, Flood Prevention and
Resource Conservation and Development *
Civil Service Commission
Intergovernmental Personnel Assistance

Matching
Requirement

Primary
Recipient
Level

High
Low
None
None
None
High

State
State
State
State
State
Local

Undetermined

Local

High

State

Department of Commerce
Development Facilities Grants*
Economic Development Center and Technical
Community Assistance3
Planning and Research

Low

Local

High
High

Local
Local

Corporation for Public Broadcasting
Corporation for Public Broadcasting

None

State

Department of Defense
National Guard Centers Construction*
Flood Control Lands1

Low
None

State
State

Environmental Protection Agency
Construction Grants *
Operations, Research and Facilities

High
Low

Local
State

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

None

State

Federal Power Commission
Payments to States Under Federal Power Act1

None

State

Funds Appropriated to the President
Appalachian Regional Development Programs4*
Disaster Relief and State and Local
Preparedness
Community Action Programs
Work Experience and Training Programs

Low

State

None
Low
None

Local
Local
Local

Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Child Development
Educational Professions Development
Emergency School Assistance
Communicable Disease Activities
Community Health Services5
Mental Health Research and Services

Low
None
None
Low
None
None

State
State
Local
State
State
State

(continued)

Federal Grant Typology: Project Grants (continued)
Federal Disbursement
(in Thousands)

Matching
Requirement

Primary
Recipient
Level

Health Manpower Education and Utilization
Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control
Work I ncentive Activities

None
Low
Low

State
State
State

Department of Housing and Urban Development
Metropolitan Development
Model Cities Program
Neighborhood Facilities
Open Space Land Grants
Urban Planning Assistance
Urban Renewal *
Water and Sewer Facilities*

High
Low
Low
High
None
Low
Low

Local
Local
Local
Local
State
Local
Local

None
None
High

State
State
State

None
High

State
State

Department of Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance

Low

State

Department of Labor
Classroom l nstruction
Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System
Employment Services
Manpower Development and Training Activities
Neighborhood Youth Corps
Operation Mainstream
Public Service Careers

None
None
None
None
Low
Low
None

State
State
State
Local
Local
State
State

Tennessee Valley Authority
Tennessee Valley Authority1

None

State

Department of Transportation
Beautification6
Federal Airport Program*
Urban Mass Transportation Administration

Low
Low
Low

State
Mixed
Local

Grant Category

Department of the Interior
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Certain Special Funds1
Land and Water Conservation Fund*
Payments to States from Receipts under
Mineral Leasing Act'
Preservation of Historic Properties

TOTALS
'Shared revenues.
2Value of commodities distributed.
31n 1967, Technical and Community Assistance.
41n 1967, this appeared as two categories: Appalachian Assistance ($6.1 16,656) and Appalachian Regional Highways ($39,888,472).
=In 1967, Community Health Practice and Research.
=In 1967, Beautification and Control of Outdoor Advertising.
'Construction grants.
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 1967 & 1972 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office) 1967 and 1972, respectively. U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Aid to States, 1967 & 1972, (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1968 and 1973, respectively. Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs, Syracuse University calculations.

Table 22

Federal Grant Typology, Formula Grants
Federal Disbursement
(in Thousands)

Matching
Requirement

Primary
Recipient
Level

High
Low
High
Low

State
State
State
State

Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Cooperative Vocational Education
Elementary and Secondary School Activities
Library and Community Services
School Assistance in Federally Affected Areas
Administration on Aging
Public Assistance (including Medicaid)

Low
None
Low
None
Undetermined
Low

State
State
State
Local
State
State

Department of the Interior
Fish and Wildlife Restoration and Management

Low

State

Department of Labor
Concentrated Employment Program
Jobs Optional
Public Employment Program

Low
None
Low

Grant Category
Department of Agriculture
Child Nutrition Programs*
Cooperative Agricultural Extension Work
Cooperative State Research Service
Food Stamp Program

a

Local
State
State

National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities
National Foundation on the Arts and
Humanities

Low

State

Department of Transportation
Highway Safety
Highway Trust Fund* *
Landscaping and Scenic Enhancement
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety

High
Low
None
High

State
State
State
State

Low

State

Water Resources Council
Water Resources Council
TOTALS

In 1967, this category appeared as two categories: School Lunch Program ($205,586,777) and School Milk Program ($95,531,709).
' "Construction grants.
Source: Office of Management and Budget, 1967 & 7972 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office) 1967 and 1972, respectively. U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Aid to States, 1967 & 7972, (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1968 and 1973, respectively. Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs, Syracuse University calculations.

FOOTNOTES

he

other major source of data on Federal grants is the Census
of Governments. Data from these two sources (Treasury and
Census) differ in several respects, and thus they cannot be used
interchangeably. For example, the Treasury reports grants on a
checks-issued basis and uses the Federal fiscal year, while the
Census data is based on receipts reported by individual State
and local governments for their individual fiscal years (several
of which diverge from the Federal fiscal year). The crucial difference between the data sources for the purpose of a grant
typology, however, is that the Census data does not provide
nearly as much detail regarding grant characteristics as the
Treasury data. It is worth noting that the Treasury reported
Federal aid of $35,941 million in fiscal 1972. The simple correlation of the 50 State distribution of grants reported by the
two data sources is .9 I .
'several important reasons for discrepancies exist. Appropriations might exceed disbursements to State and local governments. because nongovernmental agencies are eligible for
many grant programs or because disbursements lagged behind
appropriations and checks were not issued until fiscal 1973.
3 ~ . Bureau
~ . of the Census, Governments Division. Federal Payments to State and Local Governments by Program. 1972,
(unpublished).
%ime and resource constraints did not permit a program by
program allocation procedure for 1967. Few if any of these
grants have experienced fundamental changes in their char-

acter in this 5-year period. In fact: most grant programs are
simply re-funded without change in their allocation, matching,
or recipient requirements. Thus, a given grant program is assigned the same characteristics in 1967 that it had in 1972.
The funding level, howe#!er, is determined from the 1967 FePera1 Aid to States report of the Treasury Department.

5

~ Fiscal~Balance~ in the~American
.
Federal System. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) 1967, Vol. 1, Chapter 5.

6 ~ b i d .Table
.
23. p. 15 1.

or

a discussion of this point. see Miller (37). Wilde (55), and
Gramlich and Galper (26).

%ood discussions of the impact of matching grants and block.
unconditional grants are presented in Gramlich and Galper
(26), Inman (30), and Wright (57).
9 ~ e Break
e
(14A) and Maxwell (36A).
losee Reynolds and Smolensky (48A). Thii is not. however, a
surprising finding, because most grants are not designed to
equalize.
I ~ h enegative relationship -with income results from, however,
the interrelationship of income with urbanization and population size characteristics. When these latter two factors are
incorporated in a multiple regression analysis, the relationship
between income and grant type is direct-that is, high income
States tend generally to participate more in various grant
types.
I 2 ~ e a s u r e dby the numerical coefficient.

Chapter I V

The Fiscal Impact of the
Federal Grant System
Much research and policy attention has been
given to the impact of Federal grants on the fiscal
behavior of recipient State and local governments.
However, controversy and considerable gaps in our
knowledge about grant impact remain. This study
contributes to this topic by examining-at a disaggregated level of Federal grants and State fiscal
systems -the grant impact on:
.The level and mix' of State-local expenditures, and
The levels of State-local employment
and public sector wages.
Before presenting the results of the analysis, the
traditional approach to estimating grant impact is
discussed and the results summarized. A critique of
the traditional'approach is offered as well as an alternative approach - a public employment theory of
State and local government expenditure determination. The final section presents the results of
this alternative procedure.
STUDIES OF GRANT IMPACT
Generally, State and local governments are
viewed in grant impact literature as attempting to
maximize resident-voter satisfaction by trading between public and private goods subject to an income

limitation. Grants are viewed as stimulating public
expenditures, because they lower the price of public
goods (a price effect) and increase the purchasing
power of State and local government revenues (an
income effect). Most empirical analyses have assumed that expenditures per capita is a reasonable,
although not ideal, measure of public goods and
services. Using a multiple regression technique,
the quantitative relationship between per capita expenditures and Federal grants is estimated.
A brief discussion of the conceptual approaches
used in previous studies of grant impact follows. A
review of quantitative studies dealing with Federal
aid impact, an outline of the statistical or econometric problems, and a brief concluding assessment of the present state of the art are presented.
Conceptual Approaches and Issues
One important feature of the present considerable
number of grant impact studies is the variety of
approaches to that problem. These approaches differ as to whether they employ a theoretical model
or are essentially statistical analyses attempting to
link per capita expenditures with various socioeconomic factors. Past studies have also differed
in the degree to which they took into account the
differentiated nature of the grant system -the
matching, open-ended grants of the welfare and

medicare programs; the matching, close-ended programs; and the block, close-ended grant^.^ Theoretical studies have concluded that these features
result in differing State-local fiscal responses.

The Grant Impact Question
Before discussing the results of empirical studies, a framework is given by examining the issues
raised in theoretical analysis of the grant impact
question.
The economic justification for the use of matching grants as a device to change the level and pattern of spending relies on the premise that some
benefits associated with State and local government services accrue to people living' outside the
taxing province of the providing jurisdiction.
Because of these positive spillovers or external
effects, State and local governments, acting in their
own interests and in the absence of Federal aid,
would provide a smaller amount of services than is
optimum from a national point of view. A matching grant is an inducement to provide additional
services, because it lowers the price on the aided
good relative to all other goods and, thus, compensates the grant recipient for the external benefits
provided.
There may be, however, a pronounced difference
between this program intent and the actual fiscal
effects. First, the impact of a matching grant on the
fiscal behavior of the State or local government
depends on the sensitivity of the recipient jurisdiction to the change in price and income for the aided
service. The impact also depends on the particulars
of the grant program. For example, the Federal
Government has the alternative of either designing
price reducing grants that limit the amount of grant
dollars going to any individual jurisdiction (i.e.,
close-ended grants) or that leave open the amount
of funds to be allocated to the program by tying
the aid to recipient government expenditures regardless of amount spent (i.e., open-ended grants).
Past theoretical works about grants-in-aid conclude that the form of grant does make a difference.
That is, for a given public good or service, the
State-local expenditure impact will be greatest
with an open-ended matching grant, next greatest
with a close-ended matching grant, and least for a
nonmatching grant. It is also true that, regardless
of grant type, the expenditure impact will be greater
if the grant is offered for a public good or service
not previously supported by States and localities,

because this procedure precludes the substitution of
Federal dollars for State or local money.
Block grants, as distinguished from matching
grants, are designed to have a less distortive effect
on local budgets. In fact, however, the presence or
absence of distortion depends on how broad the
general purposes of the grant are. At the extreme,
even general revenue sharing is not general, because it excludes education. Moreover, the inclusion of a tax effort component in the general revenue sharing formula means that recipient governments must pay some price to receive the funds.3
Thus, different types of grants can be expected to
have different impacts on local fiscal behavior and,
ultimately, on public service levels.
The effect of grants on public service levels and
distribution of local resources between the public
and private sector is central to the grant impact
question. But public finance economists have long
recognized the difficulties involved in measuring
output in the public service sector of the economy.4
Such problems have led to the use of expenditures
for public goods as an approximate measure of output in the public sector; thus, the impact question
has traditionally been: How do grants affect spending levels? More specifically, concern with grant
impact centers around whether grants stimulate
additional State and local government expenditures
or whether they are substituted for what otherwise
would be higher State and local government taxes.

Statistical Approaches
Early studies of variations in State-local expenditures used a statistical approach to determine the
presence or absence of regularities between government expenditure levels and socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics. Such studies as Fabricant [ 191, Fisher [21], and Brazer [14] analyzed
variations among governmental units in per capita
expenditures. These and other similar studies used
measures that relate either to the cost of provision
of public services or to the quantity demanded of public services as independent or explanatory factor^.^
Early studies generally did not include Federal
aid as one of the explanatory variables, although
later studies did (Sack and Harris [491 ). The argument against inclusion of Federal grants is that
their level is at least determined partially by State
and local government fiscal activity, and, therefore,
grants are not a truly independent factor.
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Demand-Oriented Approaches
Another approach to analysis of variations in
State and local government expenditures stress that
variations stem from differences in demand for
public services. In such studies, major factors
shaping government expenditures are the level of
income, which acts as a limit or constraint, or those
measures that relate to citizen preferences or taste
for public services. The preferences to be satisfied
may be those of the community or society (Henderson [281, Gramlich and Galper [261, Pidot [451,
etc.); the decisionmakers (Smith [521, Inman [301,
McGuire [35]); or the average or median voter
(Barr and Davis [91, Borcherding and Deacon [131).
These preferences may include public and private
expenditures as well as taxes (Grarnlich [27], Henderson [28], Johnson and Junk [331), or, more generally, a tax expenditure trade-off (Barro [9A]).
Once the appropriate trade-offs hdve been specified,
the highest level of satisfaction attainable by the
available resources is estimated.
Gramlich [271 has emphasized the importance of
budget constraint in this general approach. All
grants tend to relax the recipient government's
budget limit or constraint, because they provide
additional resources. Those grants with matching
provisions, however, also change the relative price
of-or the subsidy provided for-the aided good.
Other factors (such as debt) that influence budget
cbnstraint and that often are neglected in studies
of local government fiscal behavior are included in
Gramlich's analyses.

Demand-Supply Approaches
Attempts to isolate demand and supply influence
on spending for public services are a recent development in empirical analyses, although the problem
was posed by Miner [38] long ago. Estimating procedures such as these assume that the supply of the
public service is offered at a constant price.6
It should be noted that the vast majority of the
grant impact literature, both theoretical and empirical, is of a type termed "partial equilibrium" analysis. This means that, although the effect of Federal
grants on the State-local sector is estimated, this
effect is considered only at one point in a chain of
economic interrelationships. Additional interrelationships also may result from Federal grants, but
these are not considered to warrant specific attention in partial equilibrium analysis. For example,

the price of public services is considered constant unaffected by increased purchases by the State-local
sector. This approach simplifies considerably the
analysis and is, in most instances, a valid approximation. However, James [311 notes that for large
grant programs, in which additional relationships
between the Federal grant and other economic sectors become more important, the conclusions of the
partial equilibrium approach need not remain valid.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Previous Studies
With so many empirical studies available, a summary of the previous findings-particularly with
regard to the stimulative and substitutive effects of
grants-is in order. Although all studies cannot be
covered and every modification or data adjustment
cannot be discussed, it is possible to establish the
consensus that exists regarding the grant impact
issue (see Table 23).
The earliest studies of interstate variations in per
capita expenditures tend to relate these differences
to various socioeconomic and demographic factors
and, in particular, to income, urbanization, and
population density. One of the earliest determinant
studies to include Federal aid as an explanatory
variable was by Kurnow [34]. This study found that
one dollar per capita increase in Federal aid was
associated with a $2.45 per capita increase in Statelocal expenditures (including Federal aid).
Because the explanatory power of the three
traditional variables (income, population density,
and urbanization) was found to decline over the
years, Sacks and Harris [49] argued that the increased importance of Federal aid must be recognized. Using a multiple regression analysis for
total expenditures and several individual functions,
this study included both Federal and State aid
variables as well as the more familiar density, income, and urban factors. The results showed Federal aid to be a significant explanatory factor in
three of four individual functions and in aggregate
expenditures, with the State-local expenditure response ranging from $0.93 to $1.55 per dollar of
Federal aid.
An analysis by Bahl and Saunders [71 also found
that the explanatory power provided by the three
variables -income, population density, and urbanization -declined and that inclusion of a Federal aid

Table 23

The Stimulative Effects of Grants, Summary of Results

Author

Units of
Analysis

Year

Dependent7
Variable

Independent
Variable

Function

Conclusion6

Grant
Impact
Coefficient1

Data Set

Kurnow

State and local
governments
48 States

1957

per capita
expenditures

per capita
Federal aid

log-linear4

complementary

2.45

cross section

Sacks and Harris

State and local
governments
48 States

1960

per capita
expenditures

per capita
Federal aid

linear

stimulative

1.55

cross section

Bahl and Saunders

State and local
governments
48 States

19501960

change in
per capita
expenditures

change in
Federal grants

linear

stimulative

1.36

cross section

Osman

State and local
governments
48 States

1960

per capita
expenditures

Federal aid

linear

stimulative

1.94

cross section

Adams

1249 counties

1957

local fiscal
effort

per capita
Federal aid

linear

substantive

cross section

Henderson

2980 counties
nonmetropolitan

1957

per capita
expenditures

per capita
Stateiplus
Federal

linear

stimulative

cross section

Henderson

100 counties
metropolitan

1957

per capita
expenditures

per capita
State aid
plus Federal

linear

stimulative

cross section

Horowitz

State and local
governments
50 States

per capita
expenditures,
employment

Federal aid

linear

stimulative

cross section

Smith

State and local
governments
50 States

per capita
own
expenditures

per capita
Federal aid

linear

stimulative

cross section

Phelps

State and local
highways

stock of
capital

Federal aid

linear

substitutive

time series

Pidot

81 metropolitan
areas

per capita
expenditures

per capita
Federal aid

linear

stimulative

cross section

i

Johnson and Junk

43 cities

1967

per capita
expenditures

Federal grants

linear

stimulative

cross section

0 ' Brien

State and local
governments

19581966

per capita
own
expenditures

per capita
Federal grants

linear

stimulative

pooled cross
section-time
series

Gramlich and Galper

10 large U.S.
city-counties

19621970

local
expenditures

per capita5
expenditures
mandated by
grants,
exogenous
budgetary
resources

linear

stimulative

pooled cross
section-time
series

Gramlich and Galper

State and local
governments

76
quarters

local
expenditures

per capita5
expenditures
mandated by
grants,
exogenous
budgetary
resources

linear

stimulative

time series

lnman

41 cities

1967

local
expenditures

Federal aid

log-linear

stimulative

cross section

Ohls and Wales

State and local
governments

1968

per capita
local
expenditures

per capita
Federal aid

linear

substitutive

cross section

Gabter and Brest

State and local
governments

1960

per capita
state and local
expenditures

determinants
of Federal and
State aid

linear

Sharkansky

State
government

1963

state government
expenditures
per capita

Federal aid

linear

(data not comparable)

substitutive

(data not
comparable)

'Coefficients are taken from Gramlich's unpublished review [25].
%tatic expenditure response not reported.
3Elasticity.
4Multiplicativefunction, which is linearized for estimation purposes by taking the logarithm of the equation.
51ncludes Federal categorical grants and the matching expenditure by lower level government. 'jGrants are stimulative if impact coefficient exceeds unity and substitutive if coefficient is less than unity unless Federal aid is excluded from the dependent variable, in which case a positive coefficient indicates stimulation and a negative coefficient indicates substitution.
7Expendituresinclude Federal aid unless otherwise specified.

cross section

cross section

variable in the estimating equation led to a systematic association between this factor and interstate variations in per capita expeditures.
In an earlier work, Bahl and Saunders [41 introduced a time element by relating percentage changes
in expenditures among States to changes in the explanatory variables for the 1957-1960 period. The
results of this study show that for the 50-State
average, a change of $1.36 of State-local spending
resulted from a one dollar change in Federal aid.
On the other hand, the change in Federal aid was
not found to be related systematically to changes
in expenditures for a sample of 15 high-income,
high-density States.
R.F. Adams [ l l attempted to explain differences
in local fiscal effort among 1,249 less developed
county units in 1957, using Federal aid as- one explanatory variable. Recipient counties were found
to use only part of the Federal aid increment to
local income for public expenditures, while the
remainder of the aid was used to reduce local
effort. Further, Adams found that Federal aid led to
greater reduction of local effort than did State aid.
As the volume of literature concerning the impact of grants on recipient government expenditures
increased in the mid-1960s, so did the range of
questions. For example, although most - but not
all-studies noted above found Federal aid to stimulate State-local expenditures in the aggregate or
for the aided functional area, others, such as Osman
[421, studied the effect of Federal aid for a parti' cular function on other specific expenditure functions. As in earlier studies, Osman found that Federal aid generally was linked systematically to interstate expenditure variations - in six of eight functional areas and for aggregate spending, for which
a dollar of Federal aid was found to increase total
expenditures by $1.94. Osman also noted that Federal aid for several noneducational functions systematically was associated with State-local education expenditures, possibly reflecting the fact that
noneducational Federal aid was substituted for
State-local dollar expenditures in these areas and
that these freed-up State-local expenditures were
directed to the education function.
This result, however, drew criticism on the
grounds of statistical procedures and because it
implied a degree of substitutability among uses of
Federal categorical aid considered unlikely. The
statistical problem involved-simultaneous
equation bias-led some investigators to incorporate
Federal aid apportionment formulas, rather than

Federal aid dollar amounts, into their estimating
procedures. Gabler and Brest [231, for example,
employed this method in their examination of variations in per capita highway expenditures and
argued that these variations were related to income, density, urbanization, and factors used to
apportion State and Federal aid.
The lack of a generally accepted theoretical
structure in some empirical analyses resulted in
the inclusion of explanatory variables that did not
truly explain why expenditures varied. Sharkansky
[511, for example, estimated State government expenditures on the basis of several factors; one factor, however, was simply the previous year's expenditure level. ' Although this approach may have
some value in predicting future expenditure levels,
it does not explain why previous-year spending
levels varied.
A thoughtfully developed approach to the determinants of local fiscal behavior was developed by
Gramlich [27]. This approach involved estimating
relationships between expenditures and grants, as
well as taxes and expendit-ures. To recognize the
differing impacts of price-reducing and incomeincreasing grant programs on local fiscal behavior,
Gramlich estimated the response of expenditures to
several grant forms. The results suggested that a one
dollar increase in a block grant that had an attached
effort formula would increase expenditures by $0.55;
the same increase in an unconditional block grant
would increase expenditures by $0.28 and a matching grant program by $1.12.
A similar estimating procedure was used by Henderson 1281 for both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan county areas. His results indicate that a
marginal dollar of intergovernmental aid would
lead to an increase in expenditures of more than one
dollar ($1.42 for metropolitan counties, $ 1 .O4 for
nonmetropolitan counties).
As the controversy concerning the inclusion of a
Federal aid variable grew in the late 1960s, more advanced statistical and econometric techniques were
employed. Generally, these techniques were designed
to give a clearer answer to the question of how Federal grants affect the State-local expenditure response-a question that is the focus of attention here.
An analysis by Horowitz [29] used several expenditure models. Only two, however, contained Federal aid as an explanatory variable, and, in each
case, this factor was statistically significant. His
results suggest a one dollar increase led to a $1.01
and $1.26 increase in State-local expenditures.

Generally similar results were found by Smith
[521, who examined the distortion impact that Federal aid might have on aided and unaided public
services. This study estimated four individual expenditure functions and total State and local government expenditures. The Federal aid variable was
found to be statistically significant in all individual
functions except education and indicated a stimulative State-local expenditure response - a one dollar
increase in aid led to a $1.66 increase in spending.
Variation in large cities' tax bases were related
to variations in expenditures in a study by Johnson
and Junk [331. The authors developed both expenditure and revenue equations for a sample of 43 large
U.S. cities. Grants-in-aid were incorporated in
their estimating procedure and the expenditure response was again found to be stimulative-$2.02
increase per dollar of Federal aid.
A somewhat different approach was adopted by
Phelps [441 to analyze the effect of interest rate
changes on the timing and amount of State and
local government highway investments. This analysis concluded that a unit increase in Federal aid
increased the desired stock7 of State and local
highways by $4.65 per capita.
These and more recent studies have placed increased emphasis on variables representing the budget limit, while demographic factors -designed to
reflect taste for public goods and services -have
been deemphasized. Weicher and Emerine [541,
howeve'r, reintroduced taste and service condition
variables by using different factors; five factors reflected tastes while an additional six reflected service
conditions. Intergovernmental aid also was included
and found to be systematically related to State and
local expenditure variations.
Inman [301 examined 13- expenditure functions
for a cross section of 41 U.S. cities and distinguished
between lump-sum and open-ended grants. This
study found the grant variables, however, to be significant explanatory factors in only four of the 13
expenditure categories and concluded that although
Federal aid had a stimulative effect on State and
local expenditures, the expansion of expenditures
on aided services depends upon the required minimum level of service.
The recent attempts of empirical investigations to
untangle the supply and demand relationships of
public services has provided another form of analysis for determinant studies. Ohls and Wales [411 included grants as a demand determining factor for
highway, education, and local service expenditures.

They found a greater State-local sensitivity to
grants for highways than for total service expenditures, with education expenditures being least responsive. They concluded that Federal aid was substitutive in regard to State-local expenditures.
Gramlich and Galper [261 distinguished among
Federal block, unconditional, and matching grants.
The estimated effect of a one dollar increase in
matching grants was an increase in total expenditures but a decrease in, what the authors' called,
discretionary expenditures8 of State and local governments by $0.32. A one dollar increase in grants
also was associated with a $0.43 increase in current
expenditures. The same model, employed in an
analysis of ten large urban areas, revealed that a
change in block grants of one dollar would have an
estimated effect of raising current expenditures by
$0.25 and reducing taxes by $0.75. A one dollar
change in matching grants for education or social
services had the estimated effect of raising current
expenditures in the functions by $0.54 and $0.58,
respectively. Gramlich and Galper also found a
substitutive effect of Federal grants.
Miller [371 examined the possibility that certain
matching grant programs only have an income effect. The study found that the ABC Highway
matching grant program provides little incentive
for most States to change the size of their highway
program. Miller concluded that such close-ended
matching grants provide incentives only if, in the
absence of such a grant program, the State would
spend less than the matching requirement of the
offered grant; this was the case in only nine States.
This summary of the literature suggests that
two areas of concensus have been found:
A close and systematic relationship
exists between Federal grants and
State-local expenditures.
.Federal grants generally, but not always, appear to stimulate additional
State-local spending rather than substitute for it.
Lesser agreement, however, has been reached on
the issue of the amount of additional State-local
spending that is stimulated. This disagreement is
not surprising, because various studies supporting
the stimulation question have differed in many
ways -time period covered, statistical technique
employed, units of government analyzed, etc.
The points of consensus, however, hold up even

after recognizing that various econometric problems are encountered in these analyses-problems
that, unless successfully overcome, would I&d to
serious misinterpretations of the conclusions.
Simultaneous Equation Bias
The inclusion of Federal aid as an explanatory
factor in the earlier statistical studies (Kurnow
1341, Sacks and Harris 1491) provoked criticism
(Fisher [211 and Pogue and Sgontz [461) on the
grounds that the estimating procedure employed
was misspecified because of significant simultaneous
equations bias. As a result, the estimated relationships were held to be unreliable and the conclusions
drawn were subject to question.
Pogue and Sgontz [461 probed the simultaneous
equation bias and found that both State-local expenditures and Federal grants were related to similar
factors that earlier analyses had considered to be
independent variables. The joint determination of
both expenditures and grants by the identical set
of explanatory variables supports the contention
that inclusion of Federal aid in simpler expenditure
determinant models results in significantly biased
and, therefore, unreliable estimates of the aid coefficient -at least in early empirical work on the
grant impact question.
A contrary view concerning the appropriateness
of the inclusion of the Federal aid argument is
found in O'Brien [401. This and subsequent studies
have used more refined estimating procedures
and this aspect of the simultaneous equation problem appears to have been successfully overcome.
A second facet of simultaneous equation bias that
may exist results from the circularity involved in
attempting to explain total expenditures (which are
equal to expenditures from own sources of funds
plus expenditures from intergovernmental aid) by
means of explanatory variables, including intergovernmental aid. It seems clear that greater
amounts of aid lead to higher expenditures, because
aid is a component of expenditures. A number of
studies (e.g., Smith [521) attempted to correct for
this circularity by explaining expenditures net of
aid against variables that iricluded aid-a technique,
however, that may not fully remove this bias.

variables will be related among themselves. Such
interdependence, although not affecting the numerical estimate of the explanatory variables, does
affect significance tests used to determine the presence or absence of a causal relation.9 Jf the interrelationship of explanatory variables is substantial,
it becomes impossible to untangle the effect of a
change in a particular factor on the variable it is
designed to explain. In such cases, the explanatory
factor is held not to be significant when, in fact,
its influence may be drained off by its interrelationship with other variables.
The analysis done by Pidot 1431 was designed
specifically to lessen the degree of interrelation
among explanatory factors and thus avoid the problems associated with a high degree of multicolinearity. Using principal components analysis
(which reduced from 30 to six the number of potential explanatory factors), Pidot found Federal aid
to be a significant determinant of expendituresa one dollar change in Federal aid was associated
with a $2.35 change in expenditures.

Use of Cross Section Data
Unlike most areas of empirical work, studies of
the determinants of State and local expenditures
make use of cross section data-they examine variations in such expenditures among the States (or
other governmental jurisdictions) for a given time
period. The use of cross section data, however, has
been questioned (Scanlon and Strauss [501). If the
data representing each governmental jurisdiction do
not come from the same statistical universe or population, they cannot legitimately be compared. The
authors employed the usual determinants model
and estimated the model for four geographic regions within the U.S. and for urban and nonurban
U.S. counties. On the basis of their analysis, ScanIon and Strauss concluded that the data came from
different statistical populations and, therefore,
should not have been combined into a single base.
The point raised by Scanlon and Strauss, although valid, does not necessarily imply large
biases. As a practical matter, the alternatives are
time series data, which has its own problems, and
cross section analysis, which frequently is the best.

Multicolinearity

Aggregation

The use of a number of explanatory variables
introduces the possibility that these independent

Most empirical studies use aggregate State and
local government expenditures to analyze the be-

.

havior of local governmpt. In order to infer from
the aggregate behavior of governments that of a
single unit, it is necessary to assume that all governmental jurisdictions would respond in the same
manner to the explanatory variables because the
numerical estimates of each factor is an average for
those jurisdictions included in the analysis.
Aggregation of a second form has been questioned by Weicher and Emerine [541. They found
that it is possible to have a case whereby all the
numerical estimates for a particular explanatory
variable are statistically significant for each spending function, but the numerical estimate for the
same factor in aggregate State-local expenditures
turns out to be insignificant. They therefore conclude that because the numerical estimates of explanatory factors in aggregate expenditures are less
reliable than for specific functional areas, the investigation of expenditure determinants should be
restricted to individual expenditure categories.
The above are some of the more technical and
statistical reservations that have been entered in
regard to the grant impact question. As might be
expected, these reservations are more applicable to
some studies than to others. However, these reservations do not invalidate the conclusion of theoretical analyses -different forms of Federal grants can
be expected to have different effects on the Statelocal sector - nor are they sufficiently general in
applicability to invalidate the areas of consensus
found in empirical studies - Federal grants are
systematically related to State-local expenditures
and generally have been found to have a stimulative
effect. Indeed, one empirical investigator succinctly
summarizes the evolution of empirical studies:
The early studies generally showed
strong and quite significant coefficients for
grants, though the results were accepted
less than unanimously because of various
conceptual and technical problems with the
studies-lack of an underlying theory of
the behavior of State and local governments, lack of any attempt to distinguish
the different effects of different types of
grants, lack of any attempt to deal with
the possible simultaneous causation of
grants and expenditures. In more recent
times the simple determinants study has
given way to a somewhat more thorough
analysis that shows at least some recognition of these methodological problems and

makes at least some attempt to correct
them. There have also been a few attempts
to strike out in other directions and estimate the budgetary impact of grants in
new and different ways. The upshot . . .
is that now the profession should be able
to trust most of the broad empirical results of the grants literature-at least for
the United States. As empirical studies in
economics go, the remaining reservations
to some of these results seem relatively
harmless. l o

PROBLEMS WITH THE
TRADITIONAL APPROACH
The studies discussed thus far generally have
been conducted at a highly aggregate level-all
grants and their effect on total State-local expenditures. Few differentiate between grant types and
none differentiate between State-local fiscal characteristics. Thus, there is. at present, little empirical
substantiation of the theoretical analysts' findings
that different grant types can be expected to have
different impacts on the State-local sector and no
testing to determine if such differences are associated with State-local fiscal characteristics.
Virtually all previous studies have analyzed the
expenditure response of the State-local sector with
little or no attention paid to the influence of grants
on public employment and wage rates. By concentrating on public expenditures, previous studies
have not uncovered what may be important relationships with the major components of expenditures - wage rates and employment levels. Thus,
the process by which Federal grants and other explanatory factors affect expenditures has not been
revealed. Although it is well established that State
and local government expenditures increase primarily because of increases in employment and/or
in wage rates, the empirical analysis of expenditures
provides little indication whether this expenditure
effect is the result of increased State-local employment levels, public sector wage rates, or both.
From a public policy standpoint, this distinction
is of considerable importance. Although previous
studies may illustrate that grants stimulate expenditures, it does not necessarily follow that public
service levels are improved. The possibility exists
that grants roll out primarily in the form of increases in the wage rate and that there is little stimulation in terms of employee numbers. Whether

this is the actual effect or the degree to which wage
rates and public employment respond to changes in
grants or types of grants cannot be determined
from an analysis of public expenditures.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
The primary purpose of the following analysis is
to show how socioeconomic characteristics and fiscal capacities of a community determine the level
of public expenditures through their effects on wage
and employment levels.
Additionally, the process by which this effect takes place is detailed.
More specifically, estimates of grant impact on employment levels, wage rates, the interaction effect
between higher wages and employment, and welfare
expenditures is used to determine the overall impact of various types of Federal grants on Statelocal expenditures.

The Model In Brief
Total expenditures of State and local governments consist of several components-labor costs,
nonlabor costs, personal transfers, and debt service. For the purpose of this analysis, interest costs
are ignored, because they are not likely to be influenced by interstate variations in grant flows and
are relatively small-constituting only 4.5 percent
of current spending. The remaining components of
State-local spending are grouped into welfare
transfer expenditures and all other current expenditures, which includes welfare employment
and wage rates but excludes interest payments,
with differ.ent procedures used to analyze these series.
Current Expenditures Other Than Welfare Transfers

For all State-local spending other than public
welfare transfer payments and interest payments,
total current expenditures are considered as the sum
of labor plus nonlabor costs. Labor costs, in turn,
are the product of the average compensation and
the number of employees, while nonlabor costs
(other than interest payments) are taken to be a
fixed amount per employee.'* For all State-local
expenditures other than welfare transfers and interest payments, current expenditures are considered to be the result of the average level of
compensation plus an assumed fixed ratio of nonlabor costs - both elements then multiplied by the
number of employees.

Welfare Transfers

a

Welfare transfer expenditures are analyzed by the
traditional impact approach -payments per se,
rather than employment levels, are taken as the output measure. This is a reasonable assumption because the level of transfer payments appears an
appropriate indicator of interstate variations in
welfare service levels.
T o summarize, current expenditures (other than
welfare transfers and interest payments) are estimated in terms of wage rate and employment com.ponents; no such translation seemed necessary for
the transfer component of the welfare function.

Key Assumptions
The model as developed is designed to represent a
community that produces and consumes a public
good ( N ) and private goods (X) at prices (Wage
K ) and P, respectively. The output of public goods
is approxiniatel$ measured by employment in the
public sector (N), and the commlinity only can be
considered better off if it increases its output of
private goods and public employment. More specifically, an increase of one unit of public employment output must be accompanied by a fixed
amount of nonlabor inputs.
Such nonlabor costs may be illustrated by reference to police protection. In order to obtain an additional unit of output ( a policeman), the police
department must absorb not only the payroll cost of
a new employee but also the cost of a uniform, a
billy club, some fraction of the cost of a car, dispatching equipment, etc. These latter nonlabor
costs are assumed to be a fixed ratio per employee.
Although public employment is not a perfect
measure of public output. it may be the best available. It is preferable to public expenditures because
higher prices of public goods are not assumed to
result in changes in community satisfaction. Further, although mechanization and computerization
do increase employee productivity, the high labor
intensity of the State and local public sector makes
it unlikely that labor productivity will greatly
change over the relevant range of employment increase. Thus, as an approximation, it is assumed
that changes in output and employment are roughly
proportional.
Finally, whether changes in public sector employment and public sector output are proportional is
less relevant than whether the community (or com-
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munity decisionmakers) believe they are. Conceptually, it seems reasonable to assume that although
an individual's satisfaction would increase due to
increases in the number of teachers in the classroom
or policemen on the street, he would perceive no
such gain from increases in the public sector wage
rate-certainly not in the short run.
Estimating Equations

After discussion of the general framework of analysis and the assumptions underlying this approach,
it is necessary to develop the specific explanatory
factors used to estimate State and local government
output of goods and services (excluding welfare
transfers). Two such relationships are required the first, relating to public sector wage rates:13
the second, to public sector employment.
The Wage Equation

State and local government employee wage rates
are influenced by three kinds of factors: population
and labor market characteristics, intergovernmental
fiscal arrangement, and Federal grants.
Five population and labor market characteristics
are used to explain public sector wage rates:
Opportunity wage,
Unionization of public employees,
Population density of the State,
Urbanization of the State, and
Quality of the labor force.
The opportunity wage is the salary the employee
could expect to receive in alternative forms of employment. For this analysis, the opportunity wage of
a State-local employee is considered to be the previous year's average annual earnings of manufacturing sector employees. It is assumed that a local
labor market exists, that a wage rollout exists from
the manufacturing to the service (including public)
sector, and that the rollout process takes place within a year. Wage rates in the two sectors can be expected to be positively related due to either competitive forces, which tend to erase wage differentials,
or a demonstration effect, which causes public employee unions to demand wages roughly equivalent
to those obtained by private sector unions. Previous studies, 14 using different measures of the opportunity wage, have found this factor to be systematically related to public employee wage rates.

Prior research also has shown a strong effect of
unionization on public sector wage rates.15 The
extent of public sector unionization is measured by
the proportion of employment in each State affiliated with a union. It is assumed that greater union
membership reflects the presence of stronger unions.
Three additional variables are also includedpopulation density, urbanization, and labor market
characteristics. Population is included to represent
the effect that population concentrations may have
on wage rates; urbanization, to capture any wage differential effects due to high living costs; and the
quality of the labor force-measured as the median
education level of the population over 25 years of
age-to reflect differences in wage rates that may result from skills or academic training.
The second set of factors that may affect the
wage rate level is the State-local financing and expenditure split -the intergovernmental fiscal arrangement classification developed in Chapter 11. ' 6
Two factors representing the fiscal characteristics
of States -State domination or local domination are used in this analysis to determine if these fiscal
characteristics are related systematically to interstate
variations in public sector wage rates.
The third set of factors draws from grant typology. The following grant types are considered:
Project and formula grants;
High, low, and no-matching grants;
All matching and no-matching grants;
and
Total grants (Treasury data).
Additionally, a State aid variable is used. Both
Federal and State grants may stimulate expenditures via wage rate increments for two reasons. It
is possible, for example, that the matching provision
may result in increasing average wages, because new
employees have been hired that differ from those
already employed. Secondly, grants may be untied,
nonmatched, or simply substituted for State-local
own-source revenues and, therefore, be treated by
recipient jurisdictions as any increase in general
revenues and used, in part, to bid up wage rates.
The above are the specific explanatory variables
used to estimate interstate differences in State-local
wage rates.
The Employment Equation

For the employment analysis, the interstate variation in full-time equivalent State and local govern-

ment employees per 1,000 of population are related
to the following characteristics: ( 1 ) the cost of a public employee-the wage and salary plus nonlaborcosts; (2) per capita State income; (3) population
density; and (4) the skill of the population, measured
in terms of educational level.
Two additional types of factors also may influence
the level of public employment -the intergovernmental arrangement, described above, and the differing types of Federal grants previously discussed.
State aid also is included in this analysis.
It should be emphasized that a direct accelerating
effect of Federal and State grants on employment
levels may arise for at least three reasons. A stimulation of employment levels may occur, because
the grant results in an increased number of employees in the aided function. The grant may also stimulate employment in a function or program that is
supplementary or complementary to the aided function. Moreover, if grants are interchangeable, an increase in employment in an unrelated function may
result because of a pure income effect.
The Grant Variables: Statistical Treatment

At least two ways exist for estimating the impact
of various types of Federal grants on State and local
government wage rates and employment. The
first is to enter each grant type as a separate variable in equations in which all other relevant factors
(discussed above) are held the same. Although this
approach gives a separate estimate for the effect of
each Federal grant type on State-local wage rates
and employment levels, it introduces a specification
problem -it ignores the interrelatedness of different
grant types. As a result, a particular grant type will
yield an estimate that represents the effect of not
only the grant type itself but also all other grant
classifications with which it is correlated.
The approach used herein recognizes this interdependence by entering three grant groupingseach grouping adds up to the grant total. The disadvantage of this procedure is that it results in a
colinearity problem, and, thus, the tests of statistical
significance are not reliable. The latter is judged to
be less of a problem, because the estimated effect
(the numerical coefficient) is not affected by the
colinearity problem.
T o uncover the effects of various grant types,
three separate groupings are used:
Formula and project grants,

High, low, and no-matching grants, and
Matching and no-matching grants.
For each grant grouping and ,the grant total, a
distinction is made between construction and nonconstruction aids. Thus, this analysis of grant impact, and its wage rate and employment level components, is carried out in two phases-current plus
construction grants in the aggregate and for the
three grant groupings, and construction grants
only in the aggregate and by grant types.

STATISTICAL RESULTS
Public sector wage rates and employment levels
were estimated for all State-local current expenditures except welfare transfers and debt service payments." The factors used in the analysis are defined and presented with their 1972 mean values in
Table 24.18 It should be noted that although it is
necessary to develop a fully specified estimating
equation to obtain clear measures for each explanatory factor, this discussion of the statistical results centers on the effects of the different grant
types on public sector wage rates and employment
levels. Characteristics relating to population and
labor markets are discussed briefly and are presented fully in the tables.

Wage Rates
State and local wage rates (including welfare
workers but not transfer recipients) tend to respond
differently to the various types of Federal grants.19
Contrary to what might be expected, project, highmatching, and no-matching grants are all associated
with reductions in wage rates, with or without inclusion of construction grants (see Tables 25 and
26). Formula grants and all matching grants, however, are related to higher State and local wage
rates, regardless, again, of the treatment of construction grants. Despite the statistical problem
of colinearity, the inverse relationships between
both high-matching and no-matching grants (exclusive of construction) and State-local wage rates
are found to be statistically significant.
This differential wage rate response can be illustrated by reference to the various Federal grant
types. According to the statistical estimates:
A one dollar per capita increase in formula grants will raise the annual average

Table 24

Definitions of Regression Variables
Coefficient
Variable Name
Dependent Variables
Employment

Definition

Full-time equivalent employees
of State and local governments
per thousand population, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:
Education:

Wage

Average annual earnings of state
and local government employees,
in thousands of dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:
Education:

Expenditure

Per capita current direct general
expenditures in dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:
Education:

lndependent Variables
Skill
Population
Percent urban
Manufacturing wage

Per capita income
Taxes per capita
U riions

Median years of education i n 1969:
Population in thousands, 1972:
Percent of State population
in urban places, 1970:
Average annual earnings of
manufacturing workers in
dollars, 1972:
Per capita income in dollars,
1972:
Taxes per capita in dollars, 1972:
Percent of full-time State and
local government employees
organized, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:
Education:

State grants

State aid to local governments
in dollars per capita.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:
Education:

Adjusted State
grants

State aid to local governments
less Federal pass-through aid,
in dollars per capita.

(continued)

Mean

of Variation

Mean

Variable Name

Coefficient
of Variation

All functions:
Nonwelfare:
Education:
Federal grants
(Census)

Per capita Federal aid to State
and local governments in
dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:
Education:

Federal grants
(Treasury)

Per capita Federal aid to State
and local governments for classified programs in dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:

Project grants

Per capita Federal project aid
to State and local governments
in dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:

Formula grants

Per capita Federal formula grants
to State and local governments
in dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:

High-matching
grants

Per capita Federal grants with
a State or local matching
requirement of 50% or more in
dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:

Low-matching
grants

Per capita Federal grants with
a State or local matching
requirement of less than 50%,
in dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:

Federal grants
to local
governments

Per capita Federal grants
directly to local governments,
in dollars, 1972.
All functions:
Nonwelfare:

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Table 25

Determinants of State and Local Government Wage Rates, 1972, Regression Results
(T-values in parentheses)
Equation
Number

1.
2.
3.
4.

independent Variables
Manufacturing
Wage

Percent
Unionized

0.50"
(5.44)
0.492
(5.1
2)
0.423'
(3.96)
0.486'
(4.90)

0.039'
(4.58)
0.04'
(4.38)
0.036"
(4.25)
0.038
(4.48)

Skill

0.022
(.063)
0.032
(.95)
-0.110
(.31)
0.057
(0.1
7)

Density

Percent
Urban

'

State
Grants

Total1
Grants

Project
Grants

Formula
Grants

HighMatching
Grants

0.0008'
(1.78)
0.0009'
(1.81)
0.0008"
(1.67)
0.0008"
(1.75)

LowMatching
Grants

Matching
Grants

NoMatching
Grants

0.0056
(.go)

'Significant at the 5 percent level.

'U.S. Department of the Treasury data
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various data sources.

Table 26

Determinants of State and Local Government Wage Rates, 1972, Nonconstruction Grants,
Regression Results
(T-val ues in parentheses)
Equation
Number

lndependent Variables
Manufacturing
Wage

1.
2.
3.
4.

.505*
(5.4)
.503
(5.3)
,351"
(3.3)
.482*
(5.0)

Percent
Unionized

.039
(4.6)
.039*
(4.5)
,030"
(3.3)
.039
(4.6)

Density

Percent
Urban

,001"
(1.8)
.001
(1.8)
.001
(1.2)
,001
(1.8)

.031
(2.7)
,030"
(2.7)
,023"
(2.0)
.028*
(2.4)

State
Grants

,007"
(5.5)
.007*
(4.9)
.008*
(5.7)
,007'
(5.2)

Total1
Grants

R2

Project
Grants

Formula
Grants

HighMatching
Grants

LowMatching
Grants

Matching
Grants

NoMatching
Grants

.001
(0.2)

.91
-.001
(.I)

.91
,024
(1.8)

'Significant at the 5 percent level.
lU.S. Department of the Treasury data.

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various data sources.

,011
(0.8)

-.OO5"
(.5)
-.007
(0.6)

.92
.91

wage by $3.10 when construction grants
are included and approximately $2.00
when excluding construction aids. A
comparable increase in project grants
will reduce the annual average Statelocql wage by about $5.00 (including
construction) and approximately $1.00
(excluding these grants). (See Tables
25 and 26, row 2.)
A one dollar per capita increase in nomatching grants20 will reduce wages by
about $5.00 for the average State-local
employee, including construction grants,
and $7.00, excluding construction. A
similar increase in all matching grants
will increase the average annual wage
by $3.00 (including construction) and by
$ 1 1 .OO (excluding construction). (See
Tables 25 and 26, row 4.)
A one dollar per capita increase in highmatching grants will reduce wages by
$ 1 10; no-matching grants will lead to a
$3.30 d e ~ l i n e , ~and
' low-matching grants
a $5.60 increase (including construction
grants); excluding construction grants, the
comparable figures are a $256 decline, a
$5.00 decline, and a $2.40 increase for
high, no, and low-matching grants, respectively. (See Tables 25 and 26, ron 3.)

This differentiated response of State-local public
sector wage rates to the various types of Federal
grants can also be gauged by an elasticity measure,
which links the percentage change in the annual
average wage rate to a 1 percent change in the
grant categories. For the grant total and each grant
type, this sensitivity is shown to be quite small,
although the differentiated nature of the response
is also apparent (see Table 27). This means that:
1 percent change in project grants
will decrease the annual average wage by
0.017 percent, while a comparable
change in formula grants will lead to a
0.002 percent increase.

*A

.A 1 percent change in high, no, and
low-matching grants is associated with a
decline of 0.091 percent, a decrease of

Table 27

Wage Elasticities of Federal and State Grants,
1972
Per Capita
Grant Class

Average Annual Wage
%

Total State Aids
Total Federal Aids
Total Project
Total Formula
High Matching
Low Matching
No-Matching
Matching
No-Matching
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated
from various data sources.

0.007 percent, and an increase of 0.013
percent in the annual average wage,
respectively.
A 1 percent change in all matching
grants will lead to a 0.022 percent increase, while the same change in nomatching grants is associated with a
0.013 percent decline in the annual
average wage rate.
Factors representing labor market characteristics
-particularly the manufacturing (opportunity) wage,
union membership, urbanization, and population
density measures -generally were consistently related in a systematic way to State and local government wage rates. Taken together, the Federal grant
and labor market factors explained over 90 percent
of the interstate variation in wage rates. Variables
reflecting intergovernmental fiscal arrangement,
however, did not indicate any systematic association
with State-local wages.
Two conclusions emerge concerning the relationship between Federal aid and State-local wage rates.
The wage response, although differing among the
various grant types, is found to be small. Moreover,
Federal aid in the form of project, high-matching,
and no-matching grants is associated with a decrease in the State-local wage rate after other relevant factors are accounted for.

Employment Levels
A greater degree of consistency and statistical
significance emerges from the relationships between
various types of Federal grants and State-local employment levels. In each case, the nature of the relationship was direct, indicating that higher levels
of Federal grants are associated with higher levels of
employment. The different types of grants were
found to have strikingly different employment
effects," whether construction grants are included
or not. For example, when construction grants are
included (see Table 28);
Formula g r m t s tended to generate double
the number of employees than did project grants.
No-matching grants have almost twice
the employment effect of all matching
grants-a result that does not conform
with a priori reasoning.
High-matching grants are far more
stimulative than all other grant types,
but grouped with low and no-matching
grants, the latter grant type is again found
to be far more stimulative than lowmatching grants.
When construction grants are excluded (see Table
29 ):
.Project grants tend to be slightly more
employment stimulative than are formula grants.
All matching grants have minimally different employment effects than do nomatching grants.
High-matching grants are again the
most stimulative of the various grant
categories - including low and nomatch grants - but no-match grants
once more are found to be more stimulative than low-match aid, although the
difference is small.
The finding that no-matching grants tend to be
more employment stimulative than low-matching
grants is not, of course, what would have been expected. -Although at variance with a priori expectations, it is possible that this contradictory finding
reflects the fact that grant programs in the nomatching category are more in accord with State

and local preferences than those requiring a low
State-local match. As such, the State-local response-their price and income elasticity of demands - may be sufficiently greater for these lowmatch grant programs to offset the expected effect
of the grant design (matching requirements). This
explanation must, of course, be entered as only tentative, because no testing of individual grant programs has been performed.
Despite the contradictory results for low and
no-matching grants, the form of the Federal grant
clearly seems to make a difference in terms of its
effects on State and local public sector employment. Along with the factors representing population and labor market characteristics, these various
factors explain approximately 80 percent of the
interstate variations in employment levels. Variables reflecting intergovernmental fiscal arrangement, however, did not add to the explanation and,
thus, do not appear to significantly affect Statelocal public sector employment after other relevant
factors are considered.

GRANT IMPACT
Although the State-local employment and wage
rate responses to Federal grants are two key components of the grant impact issue, a discussion of the
Federal grant impact on State-local expenditures
must take note of two additional elements - indirect
employment response and welfare transfers.
The indirect employment response flows from
the fact that to the extent that Federal grants are
associated with wage rates, there also will be an effect on employment because of the relationship between wage rates and employment levels. This indirect employment effect is distinct from the direct
impact that Federal grants have on employment.
The second additional element incorporated into the
complete analysis is welfare transfers, which thus
far have been excluded. The four components, added together, give the numerical estimate of grant
impact on State and local government expenditures.
Federal grants can be expected to stimulate or
substitute for State-local expenditures. This Statelocal expenditure response consists of four components: the effect of Federal grants on Statelocal wage rates; the effect of grants on employment (direct); the indirect employment effect, which
results because Federal grants affect State-local
wages (which, in turn, tends to affect employment);
and the welfare transfer response. These effects are

Table 28

Determinants of State and Local Employment Per Capita in 1972, Regression Results
(T-values in parentheses)
Equation
Number

l ndependent Variables
Total
Wage

1.
2.
3.
4.

-2.147"
(4.8)
-2.124'
(4.74)
-1.695"
(3.45)
-2.085"
(4.57)

State
Grants

Per
Capita
l ncome

0.045'
(8.12)
0.045
(8.09)
0.033
(4.21)
0.043"
(7.60)

0.003"
(14
0.003"
(1.69)
0.003
(1.66)
0.003'
(1.84)

Skill

Density

Percent
Urban

Total1
Grants

Project
Grants

Formula
Grants

HighMatching
Grants

LowMatching
Grants

3.48'
(2.85)
3.56'
(2.87)
4.27'
(3.24)
3.322'
(2.67)

Matching
Grants

NoMatching
Grants

0.056'
(2.67)

'Significant at the 5 percent level.
'U.S. Department of the Treasury data

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various data sources.

Table 29

Determinants of State and Local Employment Per Capita in 1972, Nonconstruction Grants,
Regression Results
(T-val ues in parentheses)
Equation
Number

1.

2.
3.
4.

l ndependent Variables
Total
Wage

State
Grants

Per
Capita
Income

-2.13"
(4.9)
-2.15"
(4.9)
-1.73"
(3.3)
-2,.16*
(4.8)

0.04"
(7.0)
0.04"
(6.9)
0.04'
(5.7)
0.04
(7.0)

0.004'
(2.3)
0.004"
(2.3)
0.004"
(2.5)
0.004"
(2.3)

Skill

4.65"
(3.9)
4.35"
(3.0)
5.75'
(3.9)
4.78'
(3.5)

Density

Percent
Urban

Total1
Grants

-0.002
(1.3)
-0.002
(1.3)
-0.002
(1.1)
-0.002
(1.2)

0.005
(.I)
0.006
(.I)
-0.001
(0.0)
0.003
(0.0)

0.126"
(6.9)

Project
Grants

Formula
Grants

0.148'
(2.3)

0.11 1
(2.4)

HighMatching
Grants

LowMatching
Grants

0.76"
(1.8)

0.10"
(2.0)

"Significant at 5 percent level.
'U.S.Department of the Treasury data.

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various data sources.

Matching
Grants

0.13'
(3.0)

NoMatching
Grants

discussed in reference to total current expenditures, with emphasis on the differential impacts
resulting from the different grant types.
Concentrating first on the results for all Federal
grants (including construction grants), both the
grant totals and each of its component parts are
found to be stimulative when the welfare transfer
estimate is included (see Table 30). For total Federal grants, a one dollar per capita increase in
grants is associated with a $1.53 increase in per
capita State-local spending (including the Federal
dollar). The degree of stimulation also is found to
be highly differentiated with respect to grant type.
For example, high-matching grants are found to
stimulate per capita State-local expenditures by
$13.34, while no-matching grants again are found
to be more stimulative than those with a lowmatch requirement ($1.39 versus $1.20). Project
grants lead to a $1.92 increase in per capita Statelocal spending for each dollar of such Federal aid
and are more stimulative than formula grants, for
which the comparable increase is found to be $1.34
per capita. When all matching grants are paired
with no-matching aid, the contradictory result greater stimulation resulting from no-matching
grants-is again found; $1.73 per capita for nomatching grants13 compared with $1.46 per capita
for matching aid.
When the welfare transfer estimate is excluded,
both project and low-matching grants yield an impact estimate of less than a dollar in additional
current per capita State-local expenditures per dollar of aid-$0.75 for project grants and $0.88 for
low-matching aids. This indicates that, aside from
the welfare transfer component, the remainder of the
grant is used for either construction expenditures
(for which it may or may not be stimulative) or tax
reduction (for which the Federal aid effect would be
considered as substitutive). For each remaining grant
type, a stimulative effect was found.
The direct employment effect generated by Federal grants is the most pronounced impact for the
grant total and each different grant type (see Table
31). The sole exception is the project grant category
where the welfare payment response is greatest.
In summary, when construction grants are included in the impact analysis, the results lead to
two conclusions: Federal aid generally is stimulative regarding current expenditures and always so
when the welfare transfer component is included.
The degree of stimulation is found to be differentiated by grant type, although the finding of greater

stimulation from no-matching than low-matching
grants was not anticipated.
When grant impact is estimated for current Federal grants (excluding construction), the resultsboth including and excluding the welfare transfer
response-suggest
a stimulative effect for each
grant category. Again the results show a highly
differentiated response to the various grant types.
This impact for total current grants iodicates that a
dollar increase per capita leads to a $2.82 per capita increase in State-local spending (see Table 32).
The degree of stimulus is somewhat greater for
project than for formula grants ($3.04 versus $2.67,
including the welfare transfer response); much
greater for high-matching ($1 1.62) than for lowmatching grants ($3.88), and greater for low than
for no-matching grants ($1.58); and substantially
different comparing all matching with no-matching
grants ($4.22 versus $1.67). Estimating grant impact exclusive of construction grants thus removes
the incompat ible finding between no-matching and
matching Federal aid.
In terms of the component impacts, the direct
employment response is the major source of expenditure stimulation for each Federal grant type
(see Table 33). The wage response is generally
small for each grant category, indicating that relatively small amounts of grant receipts - regardless
of grant type-are drained off into higher Statelocal wage rates. Excluding construct ion grants leads
to a stimulative grant impact for each type of Federal
grant, whether or not the welfare transfer component
is included. This stimulation also varies markedly by
type of Federal grant.
In summary, whether grant impact is measured
with or without construction grants, the conclusions of this analysis suggest that discussions of
grant impact must recognize that important impact
differences are associated with grants of differing
characteristics. It also cannot be ignored that
State-local responses to such grants differ according to their own income and price sensitivities to
specific program areas. T o generalize about Federal grants or to predict their effects on the Statelocal sector involves a degree of risk.
From a public policy point of view, the results of
this analysis underscore that considerable attention
to grant design is imperative. Even with a clearly
articulated and appropriately drawn grant instrument. the State-local expenditure, wage rate, and
employment level response can be expected to
vary among States and among functional areas.

Table 30

Federal Grant Impact on Per Capita Expenditure
Type of Grant
and Model
Total Grants
Public Employment Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Project Grants
Public Employment Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Formula Grants
Public Employment Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Net Effects
Public Employment Model
Traditional Model
High-Matching Grants
Public Employment Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Low-Matching Grants
Public Employment Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
No-Matching Grants
Public Employment Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Net Effects
Public Employment Model
Traditional Model
Matching Grants
Public Employment Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
(Continued)

Impact of One Dollar
of Grants on Current
Expenditures

Federal Grant Impact on Per Capita Expenditure (continued)
Type of Grant
and Model

Impact of One Dollar
of Grants on Current
Expenditures

No-Matching Grants
Public Employment Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Net Effects
Public Employment Model
Traditional Model
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Table 31

Components of Federal Grant Impact
Total
Expenditures
Total Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
l ndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
Project Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
lndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
Formula Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
l ndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
No-Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
l ndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
High-Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
l ndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
Low-Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
lndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
lndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response

(Continued)

Components of Federal Grant Impact (continued)
Total
Expenditures
No-Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
lndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
'Including the welfare payment response.
2Excluding the welfare payment response.
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Table 32

.Federal Grant Impact on Pe'r Capita Expenditures,
.NonconstructionGrants
Type of Grant
and Model
Total Grants
Public Expenditure Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Project Grants
Public Expenditure Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Formula Grants
Public Expenditure Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Net Effects
Public Expenditure Model
Traditional Model
High-Matching Grants
Public Expenditure Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Low-Matching Grants
Public Expenditure Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
No-Matching Grants
Public Expenditure Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Net Effects
Public Expenditure Model
Traditional Model
Matching Grants
Public Expenditure Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
(Continued)

@

Impact of One Dollar
of Grants on Current
Expenditures

Federal Grant Impact on Per Capita Expenditures,
Nonconstruction Grants (continued)
Type of Grant
and Model

lmpact of One Dollar
of Grants on Current
Expenditures

No-Matching Grants
Public Expenditure Model
excluding welfare transfer payments
welfare transfer payments
Traditional Model
Net Effects
Public Expenditure Model
Traditional Model
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various.
data sources.

Table 33

Components of Federal Grant Impact,
Nonconstruction Grants
Total
Expenditures
Total Aid (Treasury)
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
lndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
Project Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
lndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
Formula Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
l ndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
l ndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
No-Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
lndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
High-Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
l ndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
Low-Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
Direct Employment Response
l ndirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response
I

(Continued)

Components of Federal Grant Impact,
Nonconstruction Grants (continued)
Total
Expenditures
No-Matching Aid
Expenditure Response
Wage Response
. Direct Employment Response
Indirect Employment Response
Welfare Payment Response

1.58
2.03
-0.24
2.10
0.17
-0.45

Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

Table 34

Correlation of Impact Regression Variables, Weighted by Population,
Total Grants, 1972
Skill
Manufacturing Wage
Skill
Per Capita Income
Population
Unions
Percent Urban
State Grants Per Capita
Federal Grants Per Capita1

.5667*

Per Capita
Income

.5667*
.6815*

Percent State Grants Federal Grants
Population Unions Urban Per Capita
Per Capita1

.3364*
.3868*
.6377*

.4398*
.4892*
.7249*
.6370*

.4328*
.7068*
.8013*
.7078*
.5698*

.2023
.2761*
.5716*
.6542*
.6095*
.4254*

-.3152*
-.3175*
-.3105*
-.I299
-.I419
-.2685
-. 1498

'Significant at the 5 percent level.
'U.S. Department of the Treasury data.
Source: Metropolitan Studies Program, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Calculated from various
data sources.

to attract labor

EOOTNOTES

14see Ashenfelter (3). Baird and Landon (8). Ehrenberg (18).
and Reder (47).
'A good review may be found in Edward Gramlich (25).

C

*ln the typology above. grants are cross-classified by projectformula, by the level of matching required, and by governmental recipient.
3 ~ o h n s o n (32) analyzed the source and magnitude of those
tax effork effects associated with general revenue sharing
grants.
'see Reynolds and Smolensky (48).
'lt has been pointed out that some of the explanatory f x t o r s
used in past studies stand for both quantity and price effects,
thereby clouding interpretation of the statistical results. Reviews of the determinants literature are contained in Bahl ( 5 ) ,
Bird ( I ? ) , and Wilensky (56). and a most useful bibliography
has been prepared by Fredland (22).
6 ~ h e yalso assume that the error terms of the equation do not
interact with each other. 7-he two most well-known studies of
this type are Ohls and Wales (41) and Borcherding and Deacon
(13).
7-The desired stock of highways is a long-run equilibrium concept.
' ~ i s c r e t i o n a r ~expenditures are all expenditures not mandated
by the Federal Government.
9~ulticolinearity makes the standard errors of the independent
variables larcge and it is the ratio of the numerical estimate of
a given variable to its standard error that determines its statistical significance.
loEdward M . Gramlich. "Intergovernmental Grants: A Review
of the Empirical Literature," Paper Presented to the International Seminar on Public Economics Conference, Berlin.
January 1976, pp. 1-2.
' I ~ h eunderlying conceptual model used here is spelled out in
m!)re detail in Bahl. Gustely, and Wasylenko ( 6 A ) .

+

I 2~lgebraically.E = L
S (I )
L = ( N ) ( W )( 2 )
S = K N (3)
where E = total current expenditures, other than welfare and
Interest
L = labor cost
S = nonlabor costs
N = employment
W = a v e r q e compensation
Ii = 2 constant

1 3 ~ h epublic sector wage rate is defined to include employee
contributions to retirement systems. because this is part of
the per employee price t h ~ tState and local governments pay

15see Ashenfelter (3). Baird and Landon (8). and Ehrenberg
(18).
'6~ntergovernmental fiscal arrangement is measured by two
dummy variables: ( 1 ) a State-dominated variable, which takes
the value of one if a State is State government dominated and a
value of zero otherwise; and (2) a local-dominated variable,
which takes the value of 1 if the State is dominated by local
governments and a value of zero if it is not. Shared responsibility States have a value of zero for both of these variables.
I'AII equations are estimated in linear form for 1972. 1t should
also be noted that there are several instances of significant
intercorrelation among the explanatory variables-the problem
of multicolinearit> -that hinders interpretation of the results.
(See Table 34 and text discussion of the multicolinearity problem.)
"AII regressions. including the separately estimated welfare
transfer component, are estimated in a population weighted
form to adjust for the distorting effects of outlying observations. That is, certain of the less populous but large Western
States ma> bias the results of the analysis because of the extreme differences in the amounts of grants that the! receive.
Alternativel!, the outlying observations could .have been
discarded, but such exclusions would be necessarily judgmental.

l 9 ~ e c a--.
u s ethe grant variables ore grouped, rather than estimated
individually, the statistical problem of multicolinearity is introduced. This precludes exclusive reliance on statistical tests
of significance for interpreting the estimate, but it does not
affect the numerical coefficient or sign for the various grant
types.
''~ecause no-matching grants are in the high-low-no-match set.
as well as the all matching versus no-matching pair, two estimates for the no-matching category result due to the difttring
interrelations betmeen the no-matching grants and the other
grant categories in each set.
2 1 See footnote 10 above.
77
-Because

of the units of measurement for the grant and employment variables, the effect of grants on public sector employment is not readily comprehensible. A literal reading of equation 2 in Table 28. for example, is that a one dollar per capita
increahe in formula grants increases employment by ,085 employees per 1.000 population.

%he S1.73 estimate for no-matching aid differs i m m $1.39
estimate uhen high. lo\\. and no-matching aid were used together. This is not a contradiction but results from the different grant pairings used in the equation and their different
interactions.
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